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statuteappealpleafelony
statuteappealpleafelony

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Larios-Reyes v. Lynch

Facts

Larios-Reyes entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1999. In 2013, he was charged with a second-degree sex offense and sex abuse of a minor in Maryland. He later reached a plea agreement, resulting in a conviction for a third-degree sex offense under Maryland law. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that this conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, leading to his removal proceedings.

Larios-Reyes entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1999. In 2013, he was charged with a second-degree sex offense and sex abuse of a minor in Maryland. He later reached a plea agreement, resulting in a conviction for a third-degree sex offense under Maryland law. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that this conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, leading to his removal proceedings.

Issue

Whether Larios-Reyes's conviction under Maryland law for a third-degree sex offense constitutes an aggravated felony of 'sexual abuse of a minor' under federal law.

Whether Larios-Reyes's conviction under Maryland law for a third-degree sex offense constitutes an aggravated felony of 'sexual abuse of a minor' under federal law.

Rule

The court applied the modified categorical approach to determine if the Maryland statute was divisible and whether Larios-Reyes's conviction matched the federal definition of 'sexual abuse of a minor.'

The court applied the modified categorical approach to determine if the Maryland statute was divisible and whether Larios-Reyes's conviction matched the federal definition of 'sexual abuse of a minor.'

Analysis

The court found that the Maryland statute was divisible, allowing for the application of the modified categorical approach. It determined that while Larios-Reyes's conviction included elements that matched the federal definition, it ultimately did not satisfy the requirement of acting for sexual gratification, which is a necessary element of the federal offense.

The court found that the Maryland statute was divisible, allowing for the application of the modified categorical approach. It determined that while Larios-Reyes's conviction included elements that matched the federal definition, it ultimately did not satisfy the requirement of acting for sexual gratification, which is a necessary element of the federal offense.

Conclusion

The court concluded that Larios-Reyes's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony under federal law, granted his petition for review, and vacated the order of removal.

The court concluded that Larios-Reyes's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony under federal law, granted his petition for review, and vacated the order of removal.

Who won?

Rafael Antonio Larios-Reyes prevailed in the case because the court found that his conviction did not meet the federal definition of an aggravated felony, specifically lacking the element of sexual gratification.

Rafael Antonio Larios-Reyes prevailed in the case because the court found that his conviction did not meet the federal definition of an aggravated felony, specifically lacking the element of sexual gratification.

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