Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

defendantjurisdictiondeportationappellant
defendantjurisdictionattorneystatuteappealimmigration lawdeportationappellant

Related Cases

Garcia-Torres v. Holder
View Case »
Graham v. Richardson
View Case »
Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals
View Case »
Lanuza v. Holder
View Case »
Pena-Lopez v. Garland
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Lazarescu v. United States

Facts

Appellant was deported from the United States in September 1940. Nine years later, the ship upon which he served as a crewmember arrived at the Port of Baltimore, Maryland. The Immigrant Inspector at Baltimore entered appellant's admission on the crew manifest as a bona fide seaman under 8 U.S.C.S. 203(5). During the six days the ship remained in Baltimore, appellant was not discharged and did not leave the ship. When the ship reached the Port of Norfolk, Virginia some days later, appellant was discharged and physically left the ship. Appellant was charged with and found guilty of violating 8 U.S.C.S. 180(a), in that, having been previously deported, he feloniously entered the United States at Baltimore, without lawful authorization to do so.

Appellant had been deported from the United States in September, 1940. He was a member of the crew of the S.S. Atlantic Air, which, on September 22, 1949, arrived at the Port of Baltimore. This same day, he was inspected by the Immigrant Inspector at the Port of Baltimore and his admission as a bona fide seaman under Section 3, subdivision 5 of the Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C.A. 203(5), was entered on the crew manifest. During the six days that the S.S. Atlantic Air remained in Baltimore, the defendant was not discharged and he physically did not leave the ship.

Issue

Was the District of Maryland the proper venue? Did the action of the Immigrant Inspector at Baltimore permitting appellant to land there, despite his prior deportation, constitute a lawful entry by appellant into the United States?

Two questions are presented by this appeal: (1) Was the District of Maryland the proper venue? and (2) Did the action of the Immigrant Inspector at Baltimore permitting appellant to land there, despite his prior deportation, constitute a lawful entry by appellant into the United States.

Rule

The district courts of the United States are invested with full jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of this chapter. Venue is proper at any place in the United States at which the violation may occur or at which the person charged with such violation may be found.

Venue here is controlled by 8 U.S.C.A. 164, which (so far as is here material) provides: 'The district courts of the United States are invested with full jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of (he provisions of this chapter. It shall be the duty of the United States district attorney of the proper district to prosecute every such suit when brought by the United States under this chapter. Such prosecutions or suits may be instituted at any place in the United States at which the violation may occur or at which the person charged with such violation may be found.'

Analysis

The court held that even though appellant did not leave the ship in Baltimore, he accepted admission, which constituted 'entry.' The decision of the inspector at Baltimore to permit appellant to land there, based on facts known to appellant but unknown to the inspector and misrepresented to or concealed from him by appellant, did not constitute a basis for proper legal entry. The court emphasized that the act of the Inspector in admitting appellant did not constitute the crime of which appellant was guilty; it simply removed the restraint on defendant which prevented his presence in the port of Baltimore from constituting a crime.

The act of the Inspector in admitting appellant did not, of course, constitute the crime of which appellant was guilty; it simply removed the restraint on defendant which prevented his presence in the port of Baltimore constituting a crime on his part. The port and harbor of Baltimore is territory of the United States. Entry into that territory even in a vessel amounted to a violation of the act unless appellant was under restraint which prevented his departing from the vessel. When he accepted admission so that this restraint was no longer operative, the crime of entering in violation of the statute was complete.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding appellant foreign seaman guilty of feloniously entering the United States without lawful authorization to do so.

We must, therefore, affirm the holding of the District Court that Baltimore was the port of entry here within the meaning of the immigration laws, that the statute under which appellant was charged and tried was violated at Baltimore, and that the District of Maryland was the proper venue.

Who won?

The United States prevailed in the case because the court found that the appellant's admission as a bona fide seaman constituted an illegal entry into the United States, given his prior deportation.

The United States prevailed in the case because the court found that the appellant's admission as a bona fide seaman constituted an illegal entry into the United States, given his prior deportation.

You must be