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Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions

Facts

Juan Alberto Lucio-Rayos, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization and conceded his removability. He sought discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) due to a prior theft conviction under the Westminster, Colorado Municipal Code. The immigration judge (IJ) ruled that this conviction was for a CIMT, which the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, leading Lucio-Rayos to petition the court for review.

Lucio-Rayos, a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without authorization, conceded that he is subject to removal, but seeks discretionary relief from the Attorney General in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The IJ ruled that Lucio-Rayos is not eligible to apply for cancellation of removal because his prior theft conviction under the Westminster, Colorado Municipal Code, WMC 6-3-1(A), is for a CIMT.

Issue

Whether Lucio-Rayos's municipal theft conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), affecting his eligibility for cancellation of removal.

The question presented in this petition for review is whether Petitioner Juan Alberto Lucio-Rayos's municipal theft conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude ('CIMT'), which would make him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Rule

A conviction qualifies as a CIMT only if it involves an intent to deprive the victim permanently of their property. The court applies the categorical approach to determine if the elements of the offense align with the definition of CIMT under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Although 'the INA does not provide a generic definition of 'crime involving moral turpitude,' the Attorney General, the BIA, and federal courts have generally defined 'moral turpitude' to 'refer[] to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality,' and to 'reach[] conduct that is inherently wrong, . . . rather than conduct deemed wrong only because of a statutory proscription.'

Analysis

The court applied the categorical approach to assess whether Lucio-Rayos's theft conviction under the Westminster Municipal Code constituted a CIMT. It determined that the specific provision under which he was convicted did not require proof of intent to permanently deprive the victim of property, thus failing to meet the CIMT criteria. The court also noted that the IJ's refusal to recuse did not violate due process as Lucio-Rayos did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the IJ's decision.

We first apply the 'categorical approach' to determine whether Lucio-Rayos's Westminster theft conviction qualifies as a CIMT by comparing the elements of that offense to the INA's definition of a CIMT. . . . The BIA applied that definition of a CIMT involving theft to Lucio-Rayos's case.

Conclusion

The court denied Lucio-Rayos's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his theft conviction not qualifying as a CIMT.

Thus, having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), we DENY Lucio-Rayos's petition for review.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case as the court upheld the BIA's decision, concluding that Lucio-Rayos's conviction did not meet the criteria for a CIMT and that he failed to prove his eligibility for cancellation of removal.

We, therefore, uphold the Board of Immigration Appeals ('BIA')'s determination that Lucio-Rayos has not shown that he is eligible for cancellation of removal.

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