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Keywords

statuteappealpleaimmigration law
statutepleaimmigration law

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Maie v. Garland

Facts

Bryan Maie, a citizen of the Marshall Islands, was charged with fourth degree theft in Hawaii in 2017 and 2018, to which he pleaded no contest. Following these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, alleging that Maie was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) due to his convictions being classified as CIMTs. The Immigration Judge (IJ) ruled that Maie's crimes involved moral turpitude based on the state of mind required for fourth degree theft in Hawaii, leading to the BIA's dismissal of Maie's appeal.

Bryan Maie, a citizen of the Marshall Islands, was charged with fourth degree theft in Hawaii in 2017 and 2018, to which he pleaded no contest.

Issue

Did Maie's prior convictions for fourth degree theft under Hawaii law constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) for the purposes of removal under immigration law?

Did Maie's prior convictions for fourth degree theft under Hawaii law constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) for the purposes of removal under immigration law?

Rule

A theft offense categorically involves moral turpitude if it is committed with the intent to permanently deprive an owner of property. However, the BIA's recent interpretation allows for a broader definition that includes conduct that substantially erodes the owner's property rights.

A theft offense categorically involves moral turpitude if it is committed with the intent to permanently deprive an owner of property.

Analysis

The court applied the categorical approach to compare the elements of Hawaii's fourth degree theft statute with the BIA's definition of CIMTs. It concluded that Hawaii's statute was overbroad because it criminalized conduct that did not require the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, thus failing to meet the BIA's criteria for CIMTs. The court noted that the statute was indivisible, meaning it encompassed a single crime that could be committed in multiple ways, further complicating its alignment with the federal definition.

The court applied the categorical approach to compare the elements of Hawaii's fourth degree theft statute with the BIA's definition of CIMTs.

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii's fourth degree theft statute does not categorically describe a CIMT, and therefore, Maie's prior convictions do not subject him to removal under immigration law.

The Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii's fourth degree theft statute does not categorically describe a CIMT, and therefore, Maie's prior convictions do not subject him to removal under immigration law.

Who won?

Bryan Maie prevailed in the case because the court found that his prior convictions did not meet the criteria for crimes involving moral turpitude, which was essential for the BIA's removal order.

Bryan Maie prevailed in the case because the court found that his prior convictions did not meet the criteria for crimes involving moral turpitude.

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