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Keywords

statutestatutory interpretationadmissibility
statuteappealimmigration law

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Malagon De Fuentes v. Gonzales

Facts

Petitioner Alma Rita Malagon de Fuentes, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of welfare fraud and traveled to Mexico for a day. Upon her return, she was deemed an 'arriving alien' and charged with inadmissibility due to her crime involving moral turpitude. The immigration judge ruled her removable and ineligible for a waiver, a decision later affirmed by the BIA.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, claims she first came to the United States in 1982. She married, and her husband filed an I-130 petition on her behalf in August 1987. The INS approved the petition in September 1987, and Petitioner became a Lawful Permanent Resident ('LPR') on December 15, 1992. She had four children, all born in the United States.

Issue

Whether the BIA erred in determining that Petitioner was seeking admission to the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C) and whether this determination violated her constitutional rights.

The first question is whether the BIA erred in upholding the immigration judge's determination that Petitioner was seeking admission to the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).

Rule

An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is regarded as seeking admission into the United States if they have committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2). The Fleuti doctrine, which provided exceptions for certain returning residents, was superseded by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).

The statute provides that '[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of [*501] this title.'

Analysis

The court applied the rule by affirming that the petitioner, having committed a crime of moral turpitude, was correctly classified as an arriving alien under the current statute. The court found that the IIRIRA's language did not allow for the Fleuti exception, and thus the BIA's interpretation was consistent with the law. The court also determined that the rational basis review applied to the equal protection claims, finding that the distinctions made by Congress were permissible.

Despite the innocent and brief nature of her trip to Mexico, 2 Petitioner can be considered an arriving alien. IIRIRA superseded the Fleuti doctrine and its intent test when the act replaced the above-quoted provision with the current 1101(a)(13)(C).

Conclusion

The court affirmed the BIA's decision, denying the petition for review and upholding the classification of the petitioner as an arriving alien.

For the reasons that follow, the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ('BIA') is AFFIRMED.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court found that the BIA's decision was consistent with the statutory interpretation and did not violate the petitioner's constitutional rights.

The court denied the petition for review.

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