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Keywords

lawyersubpoenamotioncomplianceself-incriminationgood faith
litigationlawyersubpoenatestimonyself-incriminationgood faith

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Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574

Facts

In January 1973, Michael McKelva was convicted of selling obscene magazines. Shortly after, he received a subpoena to produce 52 magazines in a civil proceeding aimed at enjoining their distribution. McKelva's lawyer, believing that producing the magazines could lead to self-incrimination, advised him to refuse to comply with the subpoena. The court denied a motion to quash the subpoena, and when McKelva refused to produce the magazines, he was held in contempt, along with his lawyer.

Petitioner lawyer admitted that the allegedly obscene magazines subpoenaed for the purpose of enjoining their distribution were ‘of the same character’ as magazines for distribution of which his client had recently been convicted.

Issue

Whether a lawyer may be held in contempt for advising his client to refuse to produce materials demanded by a subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds during a civil proceeding.

Whether in a state civil proceeding a lawyer may be cited for contempt for advising his client, a party to the litigation, that the client may refuse on Fifth Amendment grounds to produce subpoenaed material.

Rule

A lawyer is not subject to contempt for advising a client to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in any proceeding, civil or criminal, if the lawyer believes in good faith that the material may tend to incriminate the client.

The privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted ‘in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.’

Analysis

The Court analyzed the circumstances under which the lawyer advised his client to refuse compliance with the subpoena. It noted that the lawyer had a reasonable basis for believing that the materials could lead to self-incrimination, especially given the client's recent conviction for similar materials. The Court emphasized that the privilege against self-incrimination must be protected and that penalizing the lawyer for providing such advice would undermine the constitutional privilege.

The privilege against compelled self-incrimination would be drained of its meaning if counsel, being lawfully present, could be penalized for advising his client in good faith to assert it.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the contempt citation against the lawyer, ruling that he acted within his rights to advise his client to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.

We hold that on this record petitioner may not be penalized even though his advice caused the witness to disobey the court's order.

Who won?

The lawyer prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the Fifth Amendment privilege and ruled that he could not be penalized for providing good faith legal advice.

We conclude that an advocate is not subject to the penalty of contempt for advising his client, in good faith, to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in any proceeding embracing the power to compel testimony.

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