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Keywords

appealtrialburden of prooffiduciarywilllease

appealtrialprobatewilllease

Related Cases

Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 369 S.E.2d 397

Facts

Luci Gardner Phillips filed four chancery suits to challenge the will and deeds of Rufus L. Gardner, claiming that he lacked the mental capacity to execute them and that they were the result of undue influence by Callie L. Martin and the Franklins. The trial court found that Gardner had the mental capacity but that the instruments were executed under undue influence. The court set aside the will, deeds, and lease, leading to the appeal by the proponents.

Luci Gardner Phillips (Luci) instituted four chancery suits that are the subject of this appeal. The objects of these suits were (1) to impeach the will of Rufus L. Gardner, dated April 22, 1983, and admitted to probate in May 1983; (2) to set aside a deed from Gardner to Callie L. Martin, dated March 12, 1983; (3) to set aside a deed from Gardner to Shade M. Franklin and Mary E. Franklin (collectively, the Franklins), dated March 12, 1983; and (4) to set aside a lease from Gardner to the Franklins, dated March 15, 1983.

Issue

Did the trial court err in applying the standard of proof and in placing the burden of persuasion on the proponents of the will and deeds regarding the presumption of undue influence?

The appeal presents questions concerning the elements that give rise to a presumption of undue influence, the standard of proof required to establish those elements, and the burden placed upon the proponents of the instruments when the presumption arises.

Rule

To establish a presumption of undue influence, the evidence must show that (1) the testator was enfeebled in mind when the will was executed, (2) there was a confidential or fiduciary relationship, and (3) the testator previously expressed a contrary intention regarding property disposition.

Specifically, we have stated that, in the case of a will, a presumption of undue influence arises when three elements are established: (1) the testator was old when his will was executed; (2) he named a beneficiary who stood in a relationship of confidence or dependence; and (3) he previously had expressed an intention to make a contrary disposition of his property.

Analysis

The court determined that the trial court incorrectly required the proponents to prove not only that they did not unduly influence Gardner but also that the instruments were indeed Gardner's and not those of another person. This misapplication of the burden of proof led to the reversal of the trial court's decision.

In applying the Culpepper presumption, the trial court not only placed the burden on the proponents to show that they 'did not … unduly influence' Gardner, but also required the proponents to show that 'the instruments … are [Gardner's] will and deeds and not the will of another person.'

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing the need for the correct standard of proof in cases of undue influence.

In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erred (1) in employing the incorrect standard of proof to establish the elements that give rise to a presumption of undue influence, and (2) in applying the presumption so that the burden of persuasion, rather than the burden of production, was placed upon the proponents.

Who won?

The proponents of the will and deeds prevailed because the Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred in its application of the law regarding undue influence.

The proponents appeal from the trial court's judgment. They contend, inter alia, that '[t]he Court erred in holding that the facts in this case gave rise to a presumption of undue influence.'

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