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Keywords

appealtrialmotionleaseinterrogationadmissibility
appealwillleaseinterrogationrespondent

Related Cases

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045, 78 USLW 4159, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2218, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2731, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 135

Facts

In 2003, Michael Shatzer was incarcerated for a prior conviction when a detective attempted to interrogate him regarding allegations of sexual abuse against his son. Shatzer invoked his right to counsel, and the interrogation was terminated. He was then released back into the general prison population. In 2006, a new investigation led to another attempt to interrogate Shatzer, during which he waived his Miranda rights and made incriminating statements. The trial court denied a motion to suppress these statements, citing a break in custody due to the time elapsed since the first interrogation.

In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Hagerstown Police Department referred to the department allegations that respondent Michael Shatzer, Sr., had sexually abused his 3–year–old son. At that time, Shatzer was incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institution–Hagerstown, serving a sentence for an unrelated child-sexual-abuse offense.

Issue

Does a break in custody lasting 14 days terminate the protections afforded by the Edwards rule, which prevents further interrogation after a suspect has invoked the right to counsel?

We consider whether a break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

Rule

The Supreme Court established that the Edwards rule does not apply if a suspect has experienced a break in custody lasting 14 days, allowing for the possibility of a valid waiver of Miranda rights.

The Court concludes that the appropriate period is 14 days, which provides ample time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, consult with friends and counsel, and shake off any residual coercive effects of prior custody.

Analysis

The Court reasoned that the Edwards presumption of involuntariness is based on the coercive pressures of continuous custody. When a suspect has been released from custody and returned to normal life for a sufficient period, the likelihood of coercion diminishes. In Shatzer's case, the 14-day break allowed him to reacclimate to his surroundings and seek counsel, thus making his later waiver of rights valid.

When previously incarcerated suspects are released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routine—they regain the degree of control they had over their lives before the attempted interrogation. Their continued detention is relatively disconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investigation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Shatzer's statements made after the break in custody were admissible, as the Edwards protections no longer applied.

Because Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements.

Who won?

The State prevailed in the case, as the Supreme Court found that the break in custody allowed for the admissibility of Shatzer's statements, thereby upholding the trial court's ruling.

The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mere passage of time does not end the Edwards protections, and that, assuming, arguendo, a break-in-custody exception to Edwards existed, Shatzer's release back into the general prison population did not constitute such a break.

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