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Keywords

jurisdictionattorneyinjunctionappealappellant
jurisdiction

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Masterson v. State ex rel. Bryant, 329 Ark. 443, 949 S.W.2d 63

Facts

Between January 1993 and August 1996, Donna M. Masterson managed two bingo halls in Springdale, Arkansas. The State, represented by Attorney General Winston Bryant, filed a complaint alleging that the bingo operations were public nuisances and sought to enjoin their activities. Despite the operation of these bingo halls, no criminal prosecutions had been initiated against them, and the appellants argued that the state’s taxation of their operations indicated they were not nuisances. The chancery court ultimately ruled in favor of the State, leading to the appeal.

Between January 1993 and August 1996, Donna M. Masterson managed two bingo halls in Springdale, Arkansas.

Issue

Did the chancery court have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of the bingo halls as public nuisances, and did the operation of the bingo halls constitute a public nuisance?

Did the chancery court have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of the bingo halls as public nuisances, and did the operation of the bingo halls constitute a public nuisance?

Rule

The chancery court has the authority to abate a public nuisance, even if the act is also a crime, where the remedy at law is inadequate. The operation of a gambling house is considered a common-law public nuisance.

The chancery court has the authority to abate a public nuisance, even if the act is also a crime, where the remedy at law is inadequate.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining the stipulations of fact, which indicated that the bingo halls operated openly and continuously for an extended period without any criminal prosecutions. The court found that the existing legal remedies were inadequate to address the public nuisance created by the bingo operations, thus justifying the issuance of an injunction.

The court applied the rule by examining the stipulations of fact, which indicated that the bingo halls operated openly and continuously for an extended period without any criminal prosecutions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's decision to enjoin the operation of the bingo halls as public nuisances, concluding that the operation of these establishments met the definition of a gambling house and constituted a public nuisance.

The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's decision to enjoin the operation of the bingo halls as public nuisances.

Who won?

The State of Arkansas prevailed in the case because the court found that the operation of the bingo halls constituted a public nuisance and that the chancery court had the jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

The State of Arkansas prevailed in the case because the court found that the operation of the bingo halls constituted a public nuisance.

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