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Matter of Contempt of Greenberg, 849 F.2d 1251

Facts

Stanley I. Greenberg, representing a defendant in a criminal trial, was summarily convicted of criminal contempt by the district judge for his behavior during the government's rebuttal argument. The judge cited Greenberg's loud objections and disruptive conduct, including slamming his hand on the counsel table and repeatedly asking for a ruling. Following the incident, the judge issued an order of contempt without certifying that he had personally witnessed the conduct.

The district court convicted Stanley I. Greenberg of criminal contempt for his courtroom behavior in defending former FBI agent Richard W. Miller, who was convicted on charges of espionage.

Issue

Whether the district judge certified that he 'saw or heard' the alleged contemptuous conduct as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a), and whether Greenberg's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for a summary criminal contempt conviction.

Two issues are presented on appeal: first, whether the district judge certified that he “saw or heard” the alleged contemptuous conduct as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a); second, whether Greenberg's courtroom conduct constituted sufficient grounds for a summary criminal contempt conviction.

Rule

A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court, as stated in Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a).

Rule 42(a) states in full: A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.

Analysis

The Court of Appeals determined that the district judge's order did not fulfill the certification requirement of Rule 42(a), as it did not explicitly state that the judge 'saw or heard' the conduct. The court emphasized that procedural safeguards in summary contempt proceedings are essential to ensure due process and that the acts attributed to Greenberg did not pose an immediate threat to the judicial process, thus failing to justify a summary contempt conviction.

The certification requirement in Rule 42(a) is essential to safeguard the proper use of summary criminal contempt procedure. The requirement is not simply a legal formality. Rather, the certificate provides the basis for informed appellate review.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment holding Greenberg in criminal contempt, concluding that the procedural requirements were not met and that the conduct did not warrant such a conviction.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court holding Greenberg in criminal contempt is reversed.

Who won?

Stanley I. Greenberg prevailed in the appeal because the Court of Appeals found that the district court did not adhere to the necessary procedural safeguards for a summary contempt conviction.

The court found that the acts of counsel did not cause an obstruction of the judicial process serious enough to justify a summary criminal contempt conviction.

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