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Keywords

statuteprecedentlegislative intentrespondent
statuteprecedentlegislative intentrespondent

Related Cases

Matter of Estate of Sekanic, 229 A.D.2d 76, 653 N.Y.S.2d 449, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 01039

Facts

Decedent died intestate in 1993, survived by two brothers and a companion, who is the mother of both the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner, claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child, was granted letters of administration for the estate and sought approval of her final accounting. The respondent, also claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child, objected to the accounting and requested disinterment of the decedent's remains for DNA testing to establish paternity. The Surrogate's Court ruled that the decedent had acknowledged both claimants as his children and ordered disinterment for genetic testing.

Decedent died intestate in 1993, survived by two brothers and a companion, who is the mother of both the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner, claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child, was granted letters of administration for the estate and sought approval of her final accounting. The respondent, also claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child, objected to the accounting and requested disinterment of the decedent's remains for DNA testing to establish paternity.

Issue

Whether EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) authorizes disinterment of a body for DNA testing to establish paternity of a person claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child of the decedent.

Whether EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) authorizes disinterment of a body for DNA testing to establish paternity of a person claiming to be an out-of-wedlock child of the decedent.

Rule

The statute EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) does not contemplate postmortem DNA testing and must be construed in conjunction with Family Court Act § 519(c), which requires that such tests be administered to the putative father prior to his death.

The statute EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) does not contemplate postmortem DNA testing and must be construed in conjunction with Family Court Act § 519(c), which requires that such tests be administered to the putative father prior to his death.

Analysis

The court analyzed the legislative intent behind EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) and concluded that allowing disinterment for the purpose of establishing paternity would not only contradict the statute's language but also set a dangerous precedent for opportunistic claims against decedents' estates. The court emphasized that there must be compelling reasons for disinterment, which were not present in this case, as the respondent had no contact with the decedent during his lifetime.

The court analyzed the legislative intent behind EPTL 4–1.2(a)(2)(D) and concluded that allowing disinterment for the purpose of establishing paternity would not only contradict the statute's language but also set a dangerous precedent for opportunistic claims against decedents' estates.

Conclusion

The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's Court's order directing disinterment for genetic testing, stating that such action was not authorized under the law. The matter was remitted to the Surrogate's Court for further proceedings regarding the paternity claim.

The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's Court's order directing disinterment for genetic testing, stating that such action was not authorized under the law.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the administrator of the decedent's estate, as the court ruled against the disinterment for DNA testing.

The prevailing party was the administrator of the decedent's estate, as the court ruled against the disinterment for DNA testing.

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