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Keywords

attorneyhearingwillobjection

litigationattorneyappealhearingmotionsummary judgmentwillobjectionmotion for summary judgment

Related Cases

Matter of Henderson, 80 N.Y.2d 388, 605 N.E.2d 323, 590 N.Y.S.2d 836

Facts

Christine Henderson, the decedent, asked her long-time attorney, Irvin Husin, to prepare her will, designating himself and his family as major beneficiaries. Husin, concerned about the ethical implications, advised her to seek another attorney, which led to Martin Weinstein drafting the will based on Husin's memo. After Henderson's death, her sister objected to the will, claiming it was the product of fraud and undue influence, particularly due to the large bequest to Husin and the exclusion of her sister.

In July of 1987, Christine Henderson, the decedent, asked *391 her long-time attorney ***838 **325 and financial adviser, Irvin Husin, to prepare her will and designate himself and his family as major beneficiaries.

Issue

Whether the objectant's allegations of fraud and undue influence are sufficient to warrant a hearing into the validity of the will.

At this point in the litigation, the only issue is whether the objectant's allegations are sufficient to warrant a hearing into the validity of her claim.

Rule

An inference of undue influence arises when an attorney drafts a will in which he or she is a beneficiary, based on the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship.

In Matter of Putnam (supra, 257 N.Y. at 143, 177 N.E. 399 ), this Court held that, in the absence of an explanation, an inference of undue influence arises when an attorney has drafted a will in which he or she is a beneficiary.

Analysis

The court determined that while the Putnam inference of undue influence does not automatically apply when an attorney-legatee did not draft the will, the specific circumstances of this case warranted a hearing. The relationship between Henderson and Husin, along with the nature of the bequest and the lack of independent legal advice, raised legitimate concerns about the potential for undue influence.

However, contrary to the Appellate Division's holding, the inapplicability of the Putnam inference does not end the inquiry here.

Conclusion

The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's Court's decision regarding the objections to the will, allowing for a hearing to determine the validity of the objectant's claims of fraud and undue influence.

Accordingly, objectant's appeal, insofar as it pertains to the denial of the motion to disqualify proponent's counsel should be dismissed for nonfinality; on the appeal from so much of the order as pertained to the objections to the will alleging fraud and undue influence, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of the proponent's cross motion for summary judgment denied.

Who won?

The proponent of the will prevailed in the Appellate Division, as the court found that the objectant's submissions did not raise a triable question of fact regarding fraud or undue influence.

On the proponent's appeal, however, the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the remaining objection.

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