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Keywords

attorneysubpoenaappealpleagrand juryattorney-client privilege
defendantstatuteappealleasecompliancebailgrand jury

Related Cases

Matter of Nackson, 114 N.J. 527, 555 A.2d 1101, 57 USLW 2642

Facts

Mark Meltzer was arrested on drug charges and later indicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. His attorney, Joseph Nackson, communicated with him but had never met him in person. Meltzer, aware of his fugitive status, instructed Nackson to negotiate a plea agreement before returning to New Jersey. When Nackson was subpoenaed to disclose Meltzer's whereabouts, he refused, citing attorney-client privilege. The Law Division ruled that some questions were protected by privilege, but required Nackson to answer others, leading to an appeal.

For purposes of this appeal, we accept the facts recited in the State's brief. On November 13, 1978, the New Jersey State Police arrested Mark Meltzer in Hunterdon County on charges of criminal possession of narcotics. At the time of the arrest, Meltzer gave a Hialeah, Florida address. Bail was set by the municipal court in the amount of $10,000, ten percent cash. Shortly thereafter, the defendant posted bail and was released.

Issue

Did the attorney properly assert attorney-client privilege to refuse to disclose the whereabouts of his client to a grand jury?

The question whether the 'crime or fraud' exception requires disclosure in the circumstances of this case is a close call.

Rule

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between an attorney and client, and may only be pierced under certain circumstances, such as the 'crime or fraud' exception, which requires a careful balancing of interests.

The privilege is codified not only in our statutes and rules of evidence but also in our rules of ethical conduct.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether Meltzer's whereabouts constituted a confidence protected by attorney-client privilege. It noted that the privilege is not absolute and can yield to the public's interest in justice, but found that the circumstances did not warrant disclosure. The court emphasized that the attorney's refusal to disclose was reasonable given the context of the attorney-client relationship and the lack of compelling evidence that the privilege should be pierced.

We are unable to agree that the continuing nature of the crime of bail-jumping warrants a different substantive treatment of the privilege.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, concluding that the attorney acted within his rights to maintain confidentiality regarding his client's whereabouts.

We agree with the court below that this record falls short of demonstrating either a substantive ground for piercing the privilege (on the basis that the address was not a client confidence or that it had been lost by the 'crime or fraud' exception) or procedural compliance with the requirements of In re Farber, supra, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A. 2d 330, prerequisites to piercing the privilege in the interests of justice.

Who won?

Joseph Nackson, the attorney, prevailed because the court upheld his assertion of attorney-client privilege, recognizing the importance of confidentiality in legal representation.

Nackson was not obstructive, but in fact furnished the grand jury with relevant information about his client, the nature of his contacts, and his representation.

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