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Keywords

jurisdictionappealhearingappellantwater rights
jurisdictionappealmotionappellantmotion to dismisswater rights

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Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Bd. of Control, Docket No. II-77-2-1, 623 P.2d 764

Facts

The appellants, who had previously owned a ranch property, sought to declare two of Texaco's water rights abandoned for nonuse. However, during the proceedings, they sold their property to the Millers, who had agreed not to challenge Texaco's water rights. The Board of Control was aware of the sale but decided the matter based on the ownership at the time of the hearing. The appellants retained a mortgage on the property but were ultimately found to lack standing to appeal the Board's decision.

The order of the Board of Control denied, on its merits, appellants' request to declare abandoned for nonuse two of Texaco's adjudicated water rights for diversion, storage and use of water in Lake DeSmet Reservoir.

Issue

Did the district court err in determining that the appellants lacked standing to seek review of the order of the Board of Control?

The issue before us is whether or not the district court erred in its determination that appellants lacked standing to seek review of the order of the Board of Control.

Rule

Standing to sue requires a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution, and a party must be 'aggrieved or adversely affected in fact' by the agency's decision to have standing to appeal.

“Standing to sue” is a right to relief and goes to the existence of a personal claim for relief. It includes a legal disability, such as insanity or infancy, but it is more. It involves a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.

Analysis

The court determined that the appellants' sale of the property removed them from the status of being 'aggrieved or adversely affected in fact' by the Board's decision. The court emphasized that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any time, and since the appellants admitted to the sale, the district court was justified in addressing this issue. The court also noted that the appellants' status as mortgagees did not confer standing, as the denial of the petition for abandonment did not diminish the value of their security interest.

The fact that the sale had been made was admitted by the appellants and thus a jurisdictional issue was unquestionably before the district court. Inasmuch as the statutory foundation for appeals from administrative action requires that the petitioner who asks for review must be “aggrieved or adversely affected in fact” (s 9-4-114, W.S.1977), the district court was justified in addressing the jurisdictional question presented by the motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the appeal, concluding that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the Board's decision.

Finding a correct ruling on the issue in the district court, we affirm rather than dismiss the appeal.

Who won?

Texaco, Inc. prevailed in the case because the court found that the appellants did not have standing to appeal the Board's decision after selling their property.

We affirm.

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