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Keywords

contractsettlementplaintiffdefendantattorneynegligenceappealtrial

contractsettlementplaintiffdefendantattorneystatute

Related Cases

McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 102 Conn.App. 23, 925 A.2d 352

Facts

The plaintiff, Paul L. McCullough, represented Waterside Associates and its partners in a professional negligence action against their architect, which was settled for $500,000 before trial. McCullough had a written contingency fee agreement that entitled him to one-third of any recovery. Despite delays and claims of inadequate performance, he participated in the settlement negotiations and was the only attorney of record when the settlement was reached. The defendants refused to pay the fee, leading McCullough to file this action to recover his fees.

The plaintiff 'instituted suit against Waterside Associates and its individual partners, Arthur Collins and Arthur Emil. [The plaintiff] sought to recover for legal fees [for services] he claimed were rendered pursuant to a written agreement dated October 19, 1990 [agreement].'

Issue

The principal issue in this appeal is whether an attorney should recover fees under a written contingency fee agreement where the trial court determines that the attorney's performance was less than exemplary.

1 attorney was entitled to contingency fee;

Rule

An attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged prior to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client, and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee.

When an attorney undertakes to represent a client in a personal injury action, the attorney and his client 'may provide by contract, which contract shall comply with all applicable provisions of the rules of professional conduct governing attorneys adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, that the fee for the attorney shall be paid contingent upon, and as a percentage of: (1) [d]amages awarded and received by the claimant; or (2) settlement amount pursuant to a settlement agreement.'

Analysis

The court found that McCullough was not discharged until after a favorable settlement was reached, meaning he had fully performed his obligations under the agreement. The court ruled that despite the defendants' claims of inadequate performance, the terms of the contingency fee agreement were binding, and McCullough was entitled to the one-third fee as stipulated in the contract.

In the present case, the plaintiff was not discharged until after a favorable settlement had been reached on the defendants' behalf. At the time the case settled, the plaintiff was the only attorney of record, and he participated in the settlement negotiations. As the court found, the agreement 'was in effect at the time a settlement was reached and was therefore binding upon the parties….'

Conclusion

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that McCullough was entitled to the contingency fee and that the denial of prejudgment interest was not an abuse of discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Who won?

The plaintiff, Paul L. McCullough, prevailed in the case because the court upheld the validity of the contingency fee agreement and awarded him the fees despite the defendants' claims of inadequate performance.

The defendants also claim that the court improperly awarded offer of compromise interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52–192a.

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