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McLeod v. Jones, 105 Mass. 403, 1870 WL 6996, 7 Am.Rep. 539

Facts

The plaintiff had given a bill of sale and a mortgage of furniture to the defendant but retained possession of the furniture in his dwelling. After leaving for a visit, the plaintiff intended to return but ultimately ceased residing in Taunton. The defendant, believing the plaintiff would not return, entered the locked house and took the furniture. The plaintiff had occupied the premises for two years and left the furniture in the same state as when he used it for housekeeping.

It appeared 'that the plaintiff, while living in Providence, had given to the defendant a bill of sale of a part or the whole of the articles of furniture, and had subsequently brought them with him to Taunton; and that the plaintiff had formerly given to the defendant a mortgage of certain goods owned and used by the plaintiff in his shop, some of which goods the plaintiff testified that he subsequently carried to his house, and were among the goods taken by the defendant.'

Issue

Did the defendant have a legal right or license to enter the plaintiff's dwelling and take the furniture?

The defendant was liable as a trespasser for entering the plaintiff's close, unless he can justify his entry by some legal right, or by some license or permission so to do.

Rule

A party cannot justify entry onto another's property to retrieve goods without a legal right or permission, even if they believe the owner has abandoned the property.

The only question is, whether the ruling of the court below was correct, that 'the mere fact that his goods were in said premises under the circumstances stated' did not furnish a sufficient ground from which a license, permission or legal right could be inferred.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the defendant's belief that the plaintiff would not return justified his entry. It concluded that the mere ownership of the legal title to the furniture did not grant the defendant the right to enter the plaintiff's property without permission. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's possession was rightful and that the defendant's actions constituted a trespass.

But the possession of the plaintiff, as mortgagor, was not wrongful. The goods were rightfully upon his premises. There is nothing to show that the terms of the mortgage, or bill of sale, under which the defendant claimed them, gave him any special authority to enter for the purpose of recovering the property, in any event; nor that the removal of the goods from the shop to the house, or from Providence to Taunton, was inconsistent with the rights of the mortgagee, or against his wishes.

Conclusion

The court upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, ruling that the defendant was liable for trespass as he had no permission to enter the property.

The court held it to be insufficient 'without some license or permission from the plaintiff, express or implied.'

Who won?

The plaintiff prevailed in the case because the court found that the defendant's entry was unauthorized and constituted a trespass.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.

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Keywords

Related Cases

Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Or. 66, 147 P. 935, Am.Ann.Cas. 1917A,898

Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773

Hageman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 45 Ohio St.2d 178, 343 N.E.2d 121, 74 O.O.2d 295

Matter of Estate of Sekanic, 229 A.D.2d 76, 653 N.Y.S.2d 449, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 01039

Comstock v. Smith, 13 Pick. 116, 30 Mass. 116, 1832 WL 2541, 23 Am.Dec. 670