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Keywords

jurisdictionappealpleahabeas corpusliensguilty plea
jurisdictionappealpleahabeas corpusliensguilty plea

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Medellin-Reyes v. Gonzales

Facts

The first alien filed his habeas petition while serving his sentence for illegal reentry. The court noted that it was required to treat the transferred case as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for review under 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); however, 242(d)(1) of the INA permitted a petition for review only after the Board of Immigration Appeals had rendered a decision, and the first alien never sought review by the Board. The court noted that nothing in the Real ID Act or 242 of the INA authorized it to review immigration judges' decisions. Thus, the court dismissed the petition. With regard to the second alien, he contended that he was entitled to a remand so that the Board could decide whether to permit him to stay notwithstanding his drug convictions. The basis of the request was the fact that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 did not apply to aliens whose convictions rested on pre-enactment guilty pleas. The court found that the alien's delay in seeking review did not divest it of jurisdiction because the case was pending when the Real ID Act took effect. Thus, the court granted the petition.

The first alien filed his habeas petition while serving his sentence for illegal reentry. The court noted that it was required to treat the transferred case as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for review under 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); however, 242(d)(1) of the INA permitted a petition for review only after the Board of Immigration Appeals had rendered a decision, and the first alien never sought review by the Board. The court noted that nothing in the Real ID Act or 242 of the INA authorized it to review immigration judges' decisions. Thus, the court dismissed the petition. With regard to the second alien, he contended that he was entitled to a remand so that the Board could decide whether to permit him to stay notwithstanding his drug convictions. The basis of the request was the fact that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 did not apply to aliens whose convictions rested on pre-enactment guilty pleas. The court found that the alien's delay in seeking review did not divest it of jurisdiction because the case was pending when the Real ID Act took effect. Thus, the court granted the petition.

Issue

Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by the aliens in light of the Real ID Act of 2005.

Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by the aliens in light of the Real ID Act of 2005.

Rule

The Real ID Act of 2005 eliminated the jurisdiction on which the petitions rested and mandated that cases challenging final administrative orders of removal pending in district courts be transferred to the court of appeals.

The Real ID Act of 2005 eliminated the jurisdiction on which the petitions rested and mandated that cases challenging final administrative orders of removal pending in district courts be transferred to the court of appeals.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by determining that the first alien's petition could not be reviewed because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies by seeking review from the Board of Immigration Appeals. In contrast, the second alien's case was treated as timely because it was pending when the Real ID Act took effect, allowing the court to grant his petition for remand.

The court applied the rule by determining that the first alien's petition could not be reviewed because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies by seeking review from the Board of Immigration Appeals. In contrast, the second alien's case was treated as timely because it was pending when the Real ID Act took effect, allowing the court to grant his petition for remand.

Conclusion

The court granted the second alien's petition and remanded with instructions that the Board consider on the merits his application for 212(c) of the INA relief. The court dismissed the first alien's petition.

The court granted the second alien's petition and remanded with instructions that the Board consider on the merits his application for 212(c) of the INA relief. The court dismissed the first alien's petition.

Who won?

The second alien, Medellin-Reyes, prevailed because the court found that his case was timely and warranted remand for consideration of his application for relief.

The second alien, Medellin-Reyes, prevailed because the court found that his case was timely and warranted remand for consideration of his application for relief.

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