Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

plaintiffdefendantappealtrialprobateeasement
plaintiffappealtrialprobatewilleasementregulationcommon law

Related Cases

Buchanan v. Cassell, 53 Wash.2d 611, 335 P.2d 600
View Case »
Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258
View Case »
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 1798 WL 587, 1 L.Ed. 648
View Case »
French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 1831 WL 117, 21 Am.Dec. 680
View Case »
Wood v. Nelson, 57 Wash.2d 539, 358 P.2d 312
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Michael J. Uhes, Ph.D., P.C., Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Blake, 892 P.2d 439

Facts

The plaintiffs, Uhes, and the defendants, Blakes, both claimed property in Jefferson County from a common grantor, the Barth Foundation, Inc. After a probate action partitioned the property, the Blakes purchased a landlocked parcel from the estate, which included a deed with a 30-foot easement. The Uhes later acquired property from the Regents of the University of Colorado and sought an easement across the Blakes' property, claiming the terrain was impassable.

Both plaintiffs and the Blakes claim certain real property in Jefferson County under and through deeds emanating from a common grantor, the Barth Foundation, Inc. In a prior probate action, the property owned by the foundation was partitioned between the Regents of the University of Colorado and the estate of Charlotte Barth Howell.

Issue

Did the trial court err in denying the Uhes' claims for an easement by necessity and by express grant against the Blakes' property?

Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in denying them a common law way of necessity across the Blakes' property. We disagree.

Rule

To establish a private way of necessity, the party must show that original ownership was held by a single grantor prior to division, necessity existed at the time of severance, and the necessity for the right must be great. An easement may be created in favor of a third party if the grantor's intent is clear from the deed.

In order to establish a private way of necessity, the party seeking the way must show that original ownership of the entire tract was held by a single grantor prior to the division thereof; the necessity existed at the time of the severance; and the necessity for the particular right must be great.

Analysis

The court found that the Uhes did not demonstrate the required necessity for a way of necessity, as evidence showed that access could be constructed within their property. However, the court also recognized that the deed language indicated an easement could be created for the benefit of the Uhes, despite their status as strangers to the conveyance, and that extrinsic evidence should not have been considered to limit the dominant estate.

The trial court received expert evidence that a road, in conformity with local regulations, could be designed and constructed wholly within plaintiffs' property from the southwest to the northeast parcels. Hence, the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs had not shown the required necessity for the way is adequately supported by the record, and thus, it will not be disturbed on appeal.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the denial of the easement by necessity but reversed the denial of the easement under the 1989 deed, remanding the case for factual determination regarding the existence of a dirt road.

Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that, if there is any dirt road within the southeast one-quarter of section 5 which had a use history and serviced the plaintiffs' property in the east half of section 5 in April 1989, the deed creates an easement over that road to connect with the public road in the southwest corner of the southeast one-quarter of section 5.

Who won?

The Blakes prevailed in the initial ruling regarding the easement by necessity, as the court found no practical inability for the Uhes to access their property. However, the Uhes were favored in the appeal concerning the express easement, as the court recognized the intent of the grantor in the deed.

The court concluded that, since the plaintiffs were strangers to the conveyance from the estate to the Blakes, they acquired no express easement under the deed, and that, in any event, the grantor estate did not intend to transfer any interest to plaintiffs' predecessor.

You must be