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Montgomery v. Clarkson, 585 S.W.2d 483

Facts

On January 28, 1943, a Warranty Deed was executed, naming James E. Stewart and Nancy E. Stewart as grantees 'jointly.' Both individuals are now deceased, with James E. Stewart having died in February 1944 and Nancy E. Stewart in August 1976. The trial court found that the deed vested title in the grantees as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, leading to a denial of partition. An appeal was taken, resulting in a reversal by the Missouri Court of Appeals.

On January 28, 1943, a Warranty Deed to the land was executed, naming as grantees 'James E. Stewart and Nancy E. Stewart, jointly.' Nancy E. Stewart was the niece of James E. Stewart. Both grantees are deceased. James E. Stewart died in February, 1944. Nancy E. Stewart died August 16, 1976.

Issue

Did the warranty deed create a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common between the grantees?

The Supreme Court, Donnelly, J., deciding case as on original appeal, held that warranty deed naming as grantees two individuals jointly created tenancy in common rather than joint tenancy inasmuch as deed did not expressly declare grant to be in joint tenancy.

Rule

According to Section 442.450, RSMo 1978, every interest in real estate granted to two or more persons shall be a tenancy in common unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.

Section 442.450, RSMo 1978 , is involved here. It reads as follows: 'Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint tenancy.'

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the warranty deed and determined that it did not contain an express declaration of joint tenancy. The use of the term 'jointly' was deemed insufficient to meet the statutory requirement for creating a joint tenancy. The court reaffirmed previous rulings that emphasized the necessity of explicit language to establish a joint tenancy.

The trial court erroneously applied the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for partition of the property.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for partition.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the appellant, as the Supreme Court ruled in favor of partitioning the property based on the interpretation of the warranty deed.

An appeal was taken to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, where the judgment of the trial court was reversed.

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