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Keywords

statutecitizenshipstatelessness

Related Cases

Morales-Santana v. Lynch

Facts

Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962 to a U.S. citizen father and a Dominican mother. His father, Jose Dolores Morales, acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 and was physically present in Puerto Rico until shortly before his nineteenth birthday. The BIA denied Morales-Santana's claim for derivative citizenship based on the more stringent requirements for unwed fathers under the 1952 Act, which required ten years of physical presence in the U.S. for fathers, compared to one year for mothers.

Morales-Santana's father, Jose Dolores Morales, was born in Puerto Rico on March 19, 1900 and acquired United States citizenship in 1917 pursuant to the Jones Act. He was physically present in Puerto Rico until February 27, 1919, 20 days before his nineteenth birthday, when he left Puerto Rico to work in the Dominican Republic for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company. In 1962 Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic to his father and his Dominican mother. Morales-Santana was what is statutorily described as 'legitimat[ed]' by his father upon his parents' marriage in 1970 and admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1975.

Issue

Did the gender-based distinction in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which imposed different physical presence requirements for unwed citizen fathers and mothers, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Rule

The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the gender-based classification in the statute, requiring that the government demonstrate that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the means employed are substantially related to those objectives.

We apply intermediate, 'heightened' scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996). Under intermediate scrutiny, the government classification must serve actual and important governmental objectives, and the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.

Analysis

The court found that the government's justifications for the gender-based distinctionensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the U.S. and avoiding statelessnesswere not advanced by the statute's requirements. The court concluded that the physical presence requirements imposed on unwed fathers were not substantially related to achieving these objectives, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause.

The Government asserts that the difference is justified by two interests: (1) ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the United States, and (2) avoiding statelessness. In what follows, we apply intermediate scrutiny to assess these asserted interests, and we conclude that neither interest is advanced by the statute's gender-based physical presence requirements.

Conclusion

The court reversed the BIA's decision and held that Morales-Santana derived U.S. citizenship at birth through his father, as the gender-based distinction in the statute was unconstitutional.

We accordingly REVERSE the BIA's decision and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Luis Ramon Morales-Santana prevailed in the case because the court found that the BIA's denial of his derivative citizenship was based on an unconstitutional gender-based distinction.

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