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plaintiffdefendantdamagesstatuteappealcommon law

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Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583

Facts

Charryl Murphy, as administratrix of her late husband Jack Raymond Murphy, filed a complaint against Martin Oil Company and James Hocker for wrongful death and related damages. On June 11, 1968, while filling his truck with gasoline at the defendants' station, Jack was injured in a fire caused by the defendants' negligence and died nine days later. The complaint included claims for wrongful death under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and for conscious pain and suffering, loss of wages, and property damage under the common law and survival statute.

The plaintiff, Charryl Murphy, as administratrix of her late husband, Jack Raymond Murphy, and individually, and as next friend of Debbie Ann Murphy, Jack Kenneth Murphy and Carrie Lynn Murphy, their children, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the defendants, Martin Oil Company and James Hocker. Count I of the complaint claimed damages for wrongful death under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and count II sought damages for conscious pain and suffering, loss of wages and property damage.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the plaintiff could recover for the loss of wages that the decedent would have earned between his injury and death, for the destruction of his clothing at the time of injury, and for the conscious pain and suffering experienced by the decedent.

On this appeal we shall consider: (1) whether the plaintiff can recover for the loss of wages which her decedent would have earned during the interval between his injury and death; (2) whether the plaintiff can recover for the destruction of the decedent's personal property (clothing) at the time of the injury; (3) whether the plaintiff can recover damages for conscious pain and suffering of the decedent from the time of his injuries to the time of death.

Rule

The court applied the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, which allow for recovery of damages for wrongful death and for personal injuries sustained prior to death, respectively.

This court first had occasion to consider the statutes in combination in 1882 in Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131. The court declared that the effect of the Wrongful Death Act was that a cause of action for personal injuries, which would have abated under the common law upon the death of the injured party from those injuries, would continue on behalf of the spouse or the next of kin and would be ‘enlarged to embrace the injury resulting from the death.’

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutes and previous case law, concluding that the Wrongful Death Act does not preclude recovery for damages incurred before death, such as loss of wages and conscious pain and suffering. The court noted that allowing both types of claims provides a more complete remedy for the damages caused by the defendants' negligence.

The holding in Holton was not compelled, we judge, by the language or the nature of the statutes examined. The statutes were conceptually separable and different. The one related to an action arising upon wrongful death; the other related to a right of action for personal injury arising during the life of the injured person.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Court's decision, allowing the plaintiff to maintain an action for loss of property, loss of wages, and conscious pain and suffering.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed insofar as it held that an action may be maintained by the plaintiff for loss of property and loss of wages during the interval between injury and death, and that judgment is reversed insofar as it held that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for her decedent's pain and suffering.

Who won?

The plaintiff, Charryl Murphy, prevailed in part because the court recognized her right to seek damages for loss of wages and property, as well as for her husband's conscious pain and suffering.

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