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defendantappealtrustwill
equityappealprobatetrustwillappellantappellee

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National Bank of Commerce of St. Louis v. Ritter, 181 Ark. 439, 26 S.W.2d 113

Facts

E. A. Ritter died in Poinsett County, Arkansas, leaving a will that established a trust for his estate, with specific provisions for his wife and children. The will stipulated that the trust would continue until the death of his widow, Anna Ritter, and that the children would only take an interest if they survived her. L. V. Ritter, one of the sons, was subject to a judgment obtained by the National Bank of Commerce, which sought to execute against his interest in the estate. The chancellor ruled in favor of the defendants, leading to the appeal.

E. A. Ritter died testate in Poinsett county, Ark., and his will was filed for probate on May 9, 1921. After making several specific bequests, the paragraphs of the will necessary for a determination of the issue raised by the appeal read as follows: '9. I give and devise and bequeath all of the residue of my estate real and personal and mixed wherever located to C. A. Dawson, Louis Ritter, my son, Harry Ritter, my son, and Louis Ritter, my brother, as trustee…'

Issue

The main issue is whether L. V. Ritter has a vested interest under the terms of his father's will that can be subjected to the payment of the judgment against him.

It is conceded that the only question presented by the appeal is whether L. V. Ritter has a vested interest under the terms of his father's will which may in equity be subjected to the payment of appellant's judgment against him.

Rule

The court applied the principle that the intention of the testator must be gathered from the will itself, and that a remainder is contingent if the right of enjoyment is uncertain.

It is a cardinal rule in the construction of wills that the intention of the testator should be carried out, and that the intention must be gathered from the will itself whenever it is possible to do so.

Analysis

The court analyzed the will's provisions, particularly focusing on the language that indicated L. V. Ritter's interest was contingent upon surviving his mother. The court noted that the will explicitly stated that if a child died without issue before the widow's death, their interest would revert to the estate, indicating that no vested interest existed until the widow's death.

The will expressly provides that the children of the dead sons or daughter shall take and be substituted per stirpes and not per capita for their parents. This would be impossible if the parents of such children could convey away their contingent share in the estate or if the same could be sold under execution against such parent during the period of the life estate.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the chancellor's decree, concluding that L. V. Ritter did not possess a vested interest that could be executed against, as his interest was contingent upon the survival of his mother.

Therefore the decree will be affirmed.

Who won?

The defendants prevailed in the case because the court found that L. V. Ritter held only a contingent interest in the estate, which could not be subjected to execution.

The chancellor found the issues in favor of appellees, and it was decreed that the complaint of appellant should be dismissed for want of equity.

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