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Keywords

settlementtortdefendantdamagesnegligenceliabilitystatutetrialwillproduct liabilitycontributory negligencecomparative negligenceadmissibilityjury instructions

settlementplaintiffdefendantliabilityappealtrialwill

Related Cases

Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,540

Facts

On May 26, 1993, Deborah Newman was driving her 1988 Ford Aerostar on Highway 125 in Greene County, Missouri, when her vehicle was rear-ended by a dump truck driven by William McCoy. The truck, loaded with gravel, struck Ms. Newman's car at approximately thirty miles per hour, causing her seat to collapse and resulting in her becoming paraplegic. The Newmans subsequently sued the truck's owner and driver for negligence and Ford for the defective design of the seat.

Deborah Newman was paralyzed after the Ford Aerostar she was driving was rear-ended by a dump truck.

Issue

The main legal issues included whether the pre-trial agreement between the Newmans and the CBS defendants should have been disclosed to the jury, the admissibility of evidence regarding other rear-end collisions, the appropriateness of jury instructions regarding 'unreasonably dangerous' design, and the applicability of contributory negligence due to Ms. Newman's failure to wear a seatbelt.

The Supreme Court, White, J., held that: (1) pre-trial agreement between motorist and truck owner, limiting any liability of truck owner to limits of its insurance policy in exchange for promise not to appeal and to employ particular law firm, was not so unfair to manufacturer to require disclosure of agreement to jury.

Rule

The court applied principles regarding the disclosure of settlement agreements, the admissibility of similar occurrence evidence, the definition of 'unreasonably dangerous' in product liability cases, and the interpretation of statutory language concerning seatbelt use and contributory negligence.

The general rule is that evidence of settlement agreements is not admissible, absent a clear and cogent reason, because they tend to be highly prejudicial.

Analysis

The court found that the pre-trial agreement did not need to be disclosed as it did not significantly distort the adversarial process. It ruled that evidence of other rear-end collisions was admissible as it was relevant to the case. The court also determined that the trial court did not err in rejecting Ford's proposed jury instruction on 'unreasonably dangerous' design, as the existing instruction was sufficient. Finally, the court concluded that the statute regarding seatbelt use did apply, but the trial court's error in giving a comparative negligence instruction could be corrected without a new trial.

The key danger of this sort of agreement is that the settling defendant will fail to operate as an adversary and, instead, seek to bolster the plaintiff's case against what a factfinder, absent knowledge of the agreement, would assume was its own interest.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment as modified, adjusting the fault percentages and increasing the damages awarded to the Newmans.

Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disclose the agreement to the jury.

Who won?

The Newmans prevailed in the case, as the jury found significant fault on the part of the truck driver and owner, leading to a substantial damages award.

The judgment is affirmed as modified.

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