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contractattorneynegligencestatutemalpracticewilllegislative intent
contractplaintifflitigationattorneystatuteappealtrialmalpracticewilllegislative intent

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Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 62 USLW 2747

Facts

In February 1984, William P. Newton underwent an angioplasty at Baptist Hospital, during which he suffered a brain air embolism, leading to a coma. After being treated and rehabilitated, Newton and his wife hired attorney James S. Cox to represent them in a medical negligence case. They signed a contingency fee contract that stipulated a 50% fee of any recovery. After settling the malpractice claim for $225,000, Newton discovered that the fee charged exceeded the statutory limit of 33 ⅓% and subsequently filed suit against Cox to recover the excess amount.

In February 1984, plaintiff William P. Newton underwent an angioplasty procedure in Baptist Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. During the procedure, he suffered an air embolism of the brain which caused him to become comatose.

Issue

Does the Medical Malpractice Claims Act establish a cause of action for a former medical malpractice claimant against their attorney for violating the statute regarding contingency fees?

We granted this application to determine whether the Medical Malpractice Claims Act, which regulates contingent attorney fee contracts, establishes a cause of action for its violation.

Rule

The Medical Malpractice Claims Act provides that attorneys in medical malpractice cases may not charge more than 33 ⅓% of the gross recovery as a contingency fee, and it establishes a cause of action for violations of this provision.

The Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act was enacted in 1975 by the Legislature to contain the cost of medical malpractice litigation because of the perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis that existed at that time.

Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed the statute's language and legislative intent, concluding that it was designed to protect medical malpractice claimants by limiting attorney fees. The court determined that the statute creates a cause of action for claimants against attorneys who violate the fee limits, thereby reinforcing public policy aimed at ensuring fair compensation for victims of medical malpractice.

The Supreme Court analyzed the statute's language and legislative intent, concluding that it was designed to protect medical malpractice claimants by limiting attorney fees.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the Medical Malpractice Claims Act is constitutional and provides a cause of action for violations, thus allowing Newton's claim against Cox to proceed.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Who won?

William P. Newton prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the Medical Malpractice Claims Act does provide a cause of action for violations of its provisions regarding attorney fees.

We hold that Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–120 is a constitutional declaration of the public policy of this state with regard to contingency attorney fee contracts in medical malpractice cases.

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