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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantnegligenceappealtrialduty of care
tortplaintiffdefendantnegligencetrialwill

Related Cases

Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161

Facts

On the evening of May 28, 1972, police officers found the plaintiff, Donald C. Parvi, and two companions engaged in a quarrel. The officers, believing the men were intoxicated, transported them to an isolated area outside the city limits instead of arresting them. After being dropped off, Parvi and one companion wandered onto the New York State Thruway, where Parvi was struck by a vehicle and severely injured, while his companion was killed.

Sometime after 9:00 p.m. on the evening of May 28, 1972, a date which occurred during the Memorial Day weekend, two police officers employed by the defendant City of Kingston responded in a radio patrol car to the rear of a commercial building in that city where they had been informed some individuals were acting in a boisterous manner.

Issue

Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for false imprisonment and negligence against the city.

The issue before us, as to each count, is whether a prima facie case was made out. We believe it was.

Rule

To establish false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to confine him, that he was conscious of the confinement, that he did not consent to it, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged. In negligence cases, the duty of care must be exercised once a person is in custody.

Only recently, we had occasion to set out the four elements of that tort in Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314, where we said that 'the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged'.

Analysis

The court found that the police officers intended to confine Parvi when they transported him, and that he was conscious of this confinement despite his intoxication. The officers failed to ensure Parvi's safety after taking him into custody, as they left him in a location that was perilously close to the Thruway. The court determined that it was foreseeable that an intoxicated person might wander onto the road, thus establishing a duty of care that the officers breached.

To the contrary, there is much in the record to support a finding that the plaintiff indeed was aware of his arrest at the time it took place. By way of illustration, the officers described Parvi's responsiveness to their command that he get into the car, his colloquy while being driven to Coleman Hill and his request to be let off elsewhere.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims and ordered a new trial, stating that both causes of action were valid.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, both causes of action reinstated and a new trial ordered.

Who won?

Plaintiff, Donald C. Parvi, prevailed because the court found that he had established a prima facie case for both false imprisonment and negligence.

The Appellate Division upheld the dismissal of the negligence cause on the ground that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a person who is under the influence of alcohol will walk approximately 350 feet in the dead of night and climb over a guardrail onto the New York Thruway.

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