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Keywords

trialrespondent
statutory interpretationwrit of certiorari

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Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (Mem), 205 L.Ed.2d 368, 19 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,041

Facts

The case revolves around the interpretation of statutory authority and the nondelegation doctrine as discussed in previous Supreme Court cases. It references Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy v. United States, which critiques the delegation of major policy decisions to executive agencies. The discussion also includes historical perspectives from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, emphasizing the need for Congress to make significant policy decisions.

I write separately because Justice GORSUCH's scholarly analysis of the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.

Issue

Whether the nondelegation doctrine applies to the delegation of major policy decisions from Congress to executive agencies.

I agree with the denial of certiorari because this case ultimately raises the same statutory interpretation issue that the Court resolved last Term in Gundy v. United States.

Rule

For an executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority over a major policy question, Congress must either expressly decide the question itself or delegate the authority to the agency to both decide and regulate.

In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority over a major policy question of great economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i) expressly and specifically decide the major policy question itself and delegate to the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate and enforce.

Analysis

The court's analysis draws on the principles established in previous cases, indicating that major policy questions require explicit congressional action or delegation. The opinions of Justices Gorsuch and Rehnquist suggest a restrictive view on delegating authority to agencies for major decisions, emphasizing the importance of legislative involvement in significant policy matters.

But the Court has applied a closely related statutory interpretation doctrine: In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority over a major policy question of great economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i) expressly and specifically decide the major policy question itself and delegate to the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate and enforce.

Conclusion

The court ultimately denied the petition for certiorari, indicating agreement with the reasoning that the case did not present a new issue beyond what was addressed in Gundy.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Who won?

The prevailing party is the respondent, as the petition for certiorari was denied, affirming the lower court's decision.

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