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Keywords

tortdefendantattorneynegligenceverdicttestimonypiracy
damagesliabilitytrialtestimonywillappelleepiracy

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Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 536 A.2d 1337

Facts

The case arose from a series of legal disputes following a multimillion-dollar verdict awarded to Pelagatti's client in the NABCOR case. After allegations of collusion between Pelagatti and the presiding judge surfaced, a law clerk, Jill Cohen, was called to testify but her testimony was disallowed. Subsequently, statements made by attorneys during press conferences led to Pelagatti filing a fourteen-count complaint against them, alleging various torts including defamation and conspiracy.

The matter before us arises from a rather complex and bizarre history, which has recently been discussed in part in the related case of Cohen v. Pelagatti, 364 Pa.Super. 573, 528 A.2d 657 (1987).

Issue

The main legal issues included whether the defendants were liable for obstruction of justice, civil conspiracy, defamation, and negligence, and whether the claims were barred by absolute or qualified privilege.

The trial court dismissed all four counts, stating that there is no civil cause of action for obstruction of justice, and that a civil conspiracy will not lie where a civil cause of action does not exist for the alleged conspiratorial behavior.

Rule

The court applied the principles of absolute and qualified privilege in judicial proceedings, determining that certain communications made in the course of judicial proceedings are immune from defamation claims, while others made outside of that context may not be.

It is well settled that private witnesses, as well as counsel, are absolutely immune from damages liability for testimony, albeit false, given or used in judicial proceedings.

Analysis

The court analyzed the claims by distinguishing between statements made in judicial proceedings, which are absolutely privileged, and those made to the press, which are only qualifiedly privileged. It found that while some claims were properly dismissed due to immunity, the defamation claims against certain defendants were sufficiently pled to warrant further examination.

The same considerations, however, do not apply to newspaper accounts of judicial proceedings, or to remarks uttered at press conferences. These are extra-judicial communications which are not subject to the internal controls of the court system, and do not require the same degree of protection as those communications which are essential to the integrity and independence of the judicial system.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the dismissal of most counts but reversed the dismissal of the defamation claims against Marion and Harvey, allowing those claims to proceed.

We therefore uphold the dismissal of Counts I through IV as to all four remaining appellees.

Who won?

The prevailing party in part was Pelagatti, as the court allowed his defamation claims to proceed against certain defendants, indicating that the allegations were sufficient to warrant further legal scrutiny.

We must proceed to the fourth criterion, the occasioning of actual damage, to determine if Counts V through VIII should have been dismissed as to Marion, Harvey, and Magarity.

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