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Keywords

lawsuitstatutediscriminationsustained
statutewilldiscriminationrespondent

Related Cases

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447, 56 S.Ct. 556, 80 L.Ed. 796

Facts

The Illinois Brick Company filed a lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company, claiming they had collected unreasonable and discriminatory charges for transporting brick from Bernice, Illinois, to locations within the Chicago switching district. The Pennsylvania Railroad had acquired control of the Panhandle Railroad in 1921. The Illinois Commerce Commission awarded reparation to the Illinois Brick Company for the period between October 28, 1920, and February 16, 1922, which included a judgment of $44,428.09 against the Pennsylvania Railroad.

December 31, 1924, respondent sued petitioner and the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company, called the Panhandle, in the circuit court of Cook county, Ill., to recover reparation awarded by the Illinois Commerce Commission on the ground that they collected from respondent unreasonable and discriminatory charges for intrastate transportation of brick from Bernice, Ill., to places within the Chicago switching district.

Issue

Whether the Illinois statutes under which the state commission acted and its order awarding reparation to the Illinois Brick Company were repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

That question is whether the Illinois statutes under which the state commission acted and its order awarding respondent reparation are repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act.

Rule

The Interstate Commerce Commission has the authority to prescribe intrastate rates to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce, and state authority is limited when federal authority is exercised.

Unquestionably the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized directly to prescribe, or to require the carriers to establish and maintain, intrastate rates to prevent or remove discrimination against interstate commerce or to make intrastate transportation yield its just proportion of the carriers' earnings.

Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the reparation awarded by the Illinois commission was in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act, as the rates in question were established under federal authority. The court emphasized that the state commission was not authorized to award reparation for transportation covered by rates that were mandated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court concluded that the state commission's actions were repugnant to federal law, which took precedence.

The order of the Illinois commission, in so far as it awards reparation in respect of transportation covered by rates that petitioner was required to put in force and maintain by the Interstate Commerce Commission's order of January 11, 1921, is plainly repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act and to that order.

Conclusion

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois and remanded the case with directions, stating that the reparation order was without foundation and could not be sustained.

The judgment below will be reversed, and the case remanded, with directions for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Who won?

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company prevailed in the case because the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the state commission's award of reparation was repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

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