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Keywords

trialcircumstantial evidencedeliberation
tortdefendanttrialmotiondivorcecircumstantial evidenceconciliation

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People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 163 P.2d 8

Facts

Richard Bennett and Rena Bennett were married in September 1943, but their relationship was tumultuous, marked by violent quarrels and discussions of suicide. On May 15, 1944, after a day of heavy drinking and a heated argument about Rena's infidelity, Rena was found dead in their apartment. The evidence indicated that she had been strangled and suffered head injuries. Bennett was arrested shortly after and claimed he found her body after returning home.

Defendant and Rena intermarried in September, 1943. Thereafter Rena learned from defendant's first wife, June, that defendant and June were not divorced. The married life of defendant and Rena was marked by violent quarrels, reconciliations, and discussions of Rena's intention to have the marriage annulled and the intentions of Rena and defendant to commit suicide.

Issue

Did the trial court err in its instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and the degree of murder, and was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder?

Defendant urges as grounds for reversal the failure of the trial court of its own motion fully to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to circumstantial evidence and the giving of an instruction that, if the specific intent to take life exists at the time of the killing, the offense ‘would of course be murder of the first degree.’

Rule

In criminal cases, the court has a duty to instruct the jury on the general principles of law pertinent to the case, especially when circumstantial evidence is involved. The distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder hinges on the presence of deliberation and premeditation.

It is the duty of a court in criminal cases to give, of its own motion, instructions on the general principles of law pertinent to such cases, where they are not proposed or presented in writing by the parties themselves.

Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence presented, noting that while there was sufficient evidence to establish that a homicide occurred, the circumstances did not support a finding of premeditation or deliberation necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. The jury was instructed on the law regarding circumstantial evidence, but the court found that the failure to provide additional specific instructions did not warrant reversal given the overall context of the case.

The evidence does not, as the People contend, compel the inference that the killing was murder of the first degree because perpetrated by means of torture… The evidence that deceased was strangled supports the finding that defendant acted with ‘malice aforethought’; i.e., ‘the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.’

Conclusion

The court modified the judgment from first-degree murder to second-degree murder and affirmed the conviction as modified.

Therefore, pursuant to the power vested in us by section 1181 of the Penal Code, the judgment should be reduced to impose the penalty prescribed by law for murder of the second degree and, as so modified, affirmed.

Who won?

The People (State) prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the conviction for murder, albeit at a reduced degree.

The People, in this connection, call attention to the fact (not mentioned in the last cited opinions) that in 1935 section 1127 of the Penal Code was amended to read, ‘the court may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case’ (italics added), whereas before 1935 the section provided that ‘the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their information’ (italics added).

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