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Keywords

defendantstatuteappealtrialwilljury instructions
defendantstatuteappealtrialmotion

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People v. Guido, 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 96

Facts

Defendant Pedro Guido was convicted of sexually assaulting his niece, M., over several years, starting when she was eight years old. The assaults included inappropriate touching and culminated in multiple instances of sexual intercourse when M. was 13. M. did not initially report the abuse due to fear and confusion about the situation, but eventually disclosed the incidents to her family, leading to Guido's arrest and conviction.

When M. was eight, her family, including her mother, her father, her maternal grandmother, her sister, her brother, and defendant, moved to a white house on Franklin Boulevard in Sacramento. During the time they lived in the white house, M. and her female cousin, who is a year younger than M., played 'hide and go seek' with defendant.

Issue

Did the trial court err in failing to define the term 'force' in the jury instructions regarding the charges of forcible rape and oral copulation?

Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to define, on it own motion, the word 'force' as that concept applies to the counts that alleged forcible rape and the additional count that alleged forcible oral copulation.

Rule

The term 'force' as used in rape and oral copulation statutes does not carry a specialized legal definition, and the trial court is not required to define it for the jury.

The court held the Legislature intended the term 'force' to have a common usage meaning and there is no sua sponte duty on the part of the trial judge to define the term for the jury.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by referencing the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Griffin, which clarified that the term 'force' in the context of sexual offenses is to be understood in its common usage. The court found that the prosecution had sufficiently demonstrated that the acts were committed against the victim's will, thus satisfying the legal requirements for the charges without needing a specialized definition of 'force.'

As Griffin recognized, the term 'force' as used by the Legislature in sexual offense statutes does not have a constant meaning; the meaning changes depending on the crime to which the term is applied.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that there was no error in the trial court's instructions regarding the definition of 'force.'

The judgment is affirmed.

Who won?

The People (the prosecution) prevailed in the case because the court found no error in the trial court's handling of the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal, Hull, J., held that the term 'force' as used in rape and oral copulation statutes does not carry a specialized legal definition requiring an instruction on its meaning.

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