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Keywords

hearingtrialtestimonytrustwillantitrustappellantgrand juryadmissibility
hearingtrialtestimonytrustwillantitrustappellantgrand juryadmissibility

Related Cases

Piccinonna; U.S. v.

Facts

Julio Piccinonna has been in the waste disposal business in South Florida for over twenty-five years. In 1983, a Grand Jury conducted hearings to investigate antitrust violations in the garbage business. The government believed that South Florida firms in the waste disposal business had agreed not to compete for each other's accounts, and to compensate one another when one firm did not adhere to the agreement and took an account from another firm. Piccinonna was compelled to testify before the Grand Jury pursuant to a grant of immunity. The immunity, however, did not protect Piccinonna from prosecution for perjury committed during his testimony. Piccinonna testified that he had not heard of the agreement between garbage companies to refrain from soliciting each other's accounts and to compensate each other for taking accounts. The Grand Jury, however, also heard testimony from several witnesses involved in the disposal industry who implicated Piccinonna in the garbage industry agreement. On August 1, 1985, Piccinonna was indicted on four counts of perjury.

Julio Piccinonna has been in the waste disposal business in South Florida for over twenty-five years. In 1983, a Grand Jury conducted hearings to investigate antitrust violations in the garbage business. The government believed that South Florida firms in the waste disposal business had agreed not to compete for each other's accounts, and to compensate one another when one firm did not adhere to the agreement and took an account from another firm. Piccinonna was compelled to testify before the Grand Jury pursuant to a grant of immunity. The immunity, however, did not protect Piccinonna from prosecution for perjury committed during his testimony. Piccinonna testified that he had not heard of the agreement between garbage companies to refrain from soliciting each other's accounts and to compensate each other for taking accounts. The Grand Jury, however, also heard testimony from several witnesses involved in the disposal industry who implicated Piccinonna in the garbage industry agreement. On August 1, 1985, Piccinonna was indicted on four counts of perjury.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Piccinonna's polygraph expert and the results of the polygraph examination.

Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Piccinonna's polygraph expert and the results of the polygraph examination.

Rule

In federal courts, the admissibility of expert testimony concerning scientific tests or findings is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this rule, to admit expert testimony, the trial judge must determine that the expert testimony will be relevant and will be helpful to the trier of fact.

In federal courts, the admissibility of expert testimony concerning scientific tests or findings is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this rule, to admit expert testimony, the trial judge must determine that the expert testimony will be relevant and will be helpful to the trier of fact.

Analysis

The court found that the wholesale exclusion of polygraph evidence under the per se rule was unwarranted in light of new empirical evidence and scholarly opinion. The court determined that polygraph evidence might be admitted at trial when both parties stipulated in advance as to the test's circumstances and the scope of its admissibility. The court also noted that polygraph evidence could be used to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness at trial, subject to certain preliminary conditions.

The court found that the wholesale exclusion of polygraph evidence under the per se rule was unwarranted in light of new empirical evidence and scholarly opinion. The court determined that polygraph evidence might be admitted at trial when both parties stipulated in advance as to the test's circumstances and the scope of its admissibility. The court also noted that polygraph evidence could be used to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness at trial, subject to certain preliminary conditions.

Conclusion

The court vacated appellant's conviction for knowingly making false statements to a grand jury and remanded for further proceedings because it found that polygraph expert testimony and polygraph examination evidence may be admissible when both parties stipulated in advance as to the test's circumstances and the scope of its admissibility.

The court vacated appellant's conviction for knowingly making false statements to a grand jury and remanded for further proceedings because it found that polygraph expert testimony and polygraph examination evidence may be admissible when both parties stipulated in advance as to the test's circumstances and the scope of its admissibility.

Who won?

Appellant prevailed in the case as the court vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceedings, allowing for the potential admissibility of polygraph evidence.

Appellant prevailed in the case as the court vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceedings, allowing for the potential admissibility of polygraph evidence.

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