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Keywords

negligenceliabilityappealtrialmalpracticeappellant
contractplaintiffnegligenceliabilitystatutetrialmotionsummary judgmentmalpracticeappellantappelleemotion for summary judgment

Related Cases

Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga.App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163

Facts

The appellant, a patient at Emory University's School of Dentistry Clinic, signed an information consent form that included an exculpatory clause waiving claims against the university and its employees. After undergoing treatment, the appellant alleged that her jaw was broken due to negligence during a dental procedure performed by Dr. Haddad, an employee of the clinic. The clinic, which charged lower fees than typical dental practices, required patients to sign the consent form before treatment. The trial court upheld the exculpatory clause, leading to the appeal.

Appellant, plaintiff in the lower court, applied and was accepted as a patient of Emory University's School of Dentistry Clinic. Appellant was advised that all treatment at the clinic would be by dental students and employees under the direction of a licensed dentist or by a licensed dentist.

Issue

Is the exculpatory clause in the consent form signed by the patient valid, or does it violate public policy?

Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment as the exculpatory clause relied upon by appellee violates the public policy of the State of Georgia, and is void as a matter of law.

Rule

Exculpatory clauses that relieve a party from liability for negligence are generally enforceable unless they contravene public policy or involve a public duty that cannot be waived.

Except in cases prohibited by statute and cases where a public duty is owed, the general rule in Georgia is that a party may exempt himself by contract from liability to the other party for injuries caused by negligence, and the agreement is not void for contravening public policy.

Analysis

The court analyzed the relationship between the dentist and patient, likening it to that of a physician and patient, which is governed by public policy considerations. It determined that the exculpatory clause in the consent form was contrary to public policy because it attempted to waive liability for negligence in a professional context where the public has a vested interest in the quality of care provided. The court referenced previous cases that invalidated similar clauses in the medical field, emphasizing the importance of maintaining accountability for professional negligence.

The relationship of dentist and patient has been likened to that of the medical doctor and patient. 'Since the ‘duties and responsibilities of a dentist to his patient are controlled by the same rules of law as control the duties and responsibilities of a physician and surgeon,‘ the malpractice issue involved here must be decided pursuant to Code Ann. s 84-924.'

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, declaring the exculpatory clause in the consent form invalid as contrary to public policy.

We hold, therefore, that the exculpatory clause in the consent form signed by a patient as a condition of receiving treatment at Emory University School of Dentistry Clinic is, for 'convincing and conclusive reasons' (Durden, supra), invalid as contrary to public policy.

Who won?

The appellant, Porubiansky, prevailed in the case because the court found the exculpatory clause to be against public policy, thus allowing her malpractice claim to proceed.

The court emphasized the public interest in the dentist-patient relationship and the inappropriateness of waiving liability for negligence in such a context.

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