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Keywords

contractsettlementappealtrialtrustdivorce
contractsettlementdefendantappealtrialdivorce

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Quenzer v. Quenzer, 225 Kan. 83, 587 P.2d 880

Facts

Anita J. and Lloyd L. Quenzer were divorced on June 23, 1971, and entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree. The agreement included provisions for the custody and support of their children, the establishment of a trust account for their education, and the payment of the mortgage on the residence awarded to the wife. The husband was required to make monthly payments of $120 until the mortgage was satisfied. After the wife defaulted on a second mortgage, the property was sold, leading to a dispute over the husband's obligation to continue payments.

Anita J. and Lloyd L. Quenzer were divorced on June 23, 1971, after having entered into a property settlement agreement which was incorporated by the court into the divorce decree.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the clause in the property settlement agreement regarding mortgage payments was ambiguous and whether parol evidence could be admitted to interpret it.

Whether ambiguity exists in an instrument is a matter of law to be decided by the court.

Rule

The court ruled that in a written contract, ambiguity does not arise from total omission, and parol evidence is only admissible to clarify vital points that the parties could reasonably contemplate at the time of the agreement.

In a contract in writing ambiguity does not arise from total omission.

Analysis

The court determined that the language of the property settlement agreement was unambiguous, clearly obligating the husband to make monthly mortgage payments until the mortgage was fully satisfied. The court found that the situation of a third party paying the mortgage was not a vital point that the parties could have reasonably contemplated, thus making the admission of parol evidence inappropriate.

In our judgment, the language of the contract is unambiguous. Defendant was obligated to make monthly mortgage payments to the Hays Savings Association in the amount of $120.00 until the mortgage was fully satisfied.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment, concluding that the property settlement agreement was unambiguous and that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence.

We hold the pertinent clause of the property settlement agreement is unambiguous and parol evidence was improperly admitted by the trial court to interpret the contract to cover a situation not contemplated by either party at the time the agreement was executed.

Who won?

The prevailing party was Lloyd L. Quenzer, as the court held that the property settlement agreement was unambiguous and did not require him to make payments beyond what was stipulated.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in Quenzer v. Quenzer, 2 Kan.App.2d 345, 578 P.2d 1144 (1978), holding the trial court erred in finding the contract was ambiguous and in admitting parol evidence.

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