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Ramirez v. Sessions

Facts

Jose Ramirez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 1996 and was later placed in removal proceedings due to his unlawful entry. He applied for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA, but the Department of Homeland Security argued that his prior convictions, including two counts of obstruction of justice, triggered a ten-year requirement for continuous presence, which he could not meet. The Immigration Judge concluded that his obstruction conviction was a CIMT, leading to his removal, which he contested in court.

Jose Ramirez, a citizen of El Salvador, first entered the United States in 1996 when he was seventeen years old. Nearly twenty years later, Ramirez was placed in removal proceedings and charged with being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At his hearing, Ramirez conceded that he had entered the country unlawfully.

Issue

Whether Ramirez's convictions for obstruction of justice under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) that would preclude him from relief under NACARA.

Specifically, the question is whether Ramirez's convictions for obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 18.2-460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).

Rule

The court applied the legal principle that a conviction must involve morally reprehensible conduct to be classified as a CIMT, and that the BIA's interpretation of state law is not entitled to Chevron deference if it does not carry the force of law.

obstruction of justice under 18.2-460(A) is not a CIMT because it may be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience.

Analysis

The court analyzed the Virginia statute for obstruction of justice and determined that it does not require morally reprehensible conduct, as it can be committed without elements such as fraud or deceit. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA's classification of the conviction as a CIMT was incorrect and not entitled to deference.

We therefore conclude that Ramirez satisfied the exhaustion requirement under 1252(d)(1) when he argued below that obstruction of justice is not a CIMT. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this question of law.

Conclusion

The court granted Ramirez's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order of removal, and remanded the case for the government to facilitate his return to the U.S. for further proceedings.

We therefore grant Ramirez's petition for review, vacate the BIA's order of removal, and remand with directions for the Government to facilitate Ramirez's return to the United States to participate in further proceedings.

Who won?

Jose Ramirez prevailed in the case because the court found that his conviction for obstruction of justice did not constitute a CIMT, allowing him to seek relief under NACARA.

The court granted Ramirez's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order of removal, and remanded with directions for the Government to facilitate Ramirez's return to the United States to participate in further proceedings.

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