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Keywords

negligencetrialpleamotionguilty plea

Related Cases

Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391

Facts

Edward A. Raso was originally indicted on charges of rape, kidnapping, sodomy, and robbery stemming from the kidnapping and rape of a teenaged girl in 1972. On September 19, 1973, he pled guilty to an amended indictment that retained the kidnapping charge but reduced the others. During sentencing on November 28, 1973, Raso's counsel made an oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which Raso supported, stating he did not understand the plea. The court denied the request to continue the sentencing and imposed concurrent sentences. Raso filed for postconviction relief in 2001, arguing the trial justice had erred in not allowing him to withdraw his plea.

Some twenty-eight years later, in September 2001, Raso filed an application for postconviction relief pursuant to the Rhode Island Post Conviction Relief Act, asking the court to vacate his guilty plea and reinstate his plea of not guilty.

Issue

Whether the Superior Court erred in denying Raso's application for postconviction relief and whether the application was barred by the doctrine of laches.

The applicant argues that the trial justice who presided over his criminal trial in 1973 erred when, in the face of an oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea (which oral motion was made on the day of sentencing), she proceeded to sentence him.

Rule

The doctrine of laches may be invoked as an affirmative defense to an application for postconviction relief, requiring a showing of negligence to assert a known right, coupled with prejudice to the adverse party.

The defense of laches requires a showing of 'negligence to assert a known right, seasonably coupled with prejudice to an adverse party.'

Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that while the Superior Court did not reach the issue of laches, it recognized that the state could properly invoke this doctrine as a defense. The court emphasized that the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Raso unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that the delay prejudiced the state. The court remanded the case for the Superior Court to make necessary factual findings regarding the laches issue.

After careful consideration, we now hold that that venerable defense of laches may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense to an applicant's application for postconviction relief.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings to determine whether Raso's application for postconviction relief was barred by the doctrine of laches.

For the reasons stated herein, we remand this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

The state prevailed in the Superior Court's initial ruling, which denied Raso's application for postconviction relief, although the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration of the laches issue.

The court chose not to reach the issue of whether the state's assertion of the doctrine of laches barred Raso's application.

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