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Keywords

jurisdictionstatutehabeas corpusleasefelonydeportationnaturalizationliens

defendantjurisdictionstatuteappealleasefelonydeportationliens

Related Cases

Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell

Facts

In February 1994, Requena pled nolo contendere to two counts of 'indecency with a child,' a second-degree felony in Texas, stemming from his sexual contact with his seven-year-old twin sons. He was sentenced to six years in prison and released in February 1996. Following his release, the INS initiated deportation proceedings against him due to his felony convictions, which made him susceptible to deportation as an alien. Requena applied for relief from deportation under former 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but was found statutorily ineligible due to the enactment of AEDPA 440(d).

In February 1994, Requena pled nolo contendere to two counts of 'indecency with a child,' a second-degree felony in Texas. The charges arose from Requena's 'sexual contact' with both of his seven-year-old twin sons. Requena was sentenced to a six-year prison term and released early in February 1996. Because Requena — who came to the United States from Mexico in October 1983 — is an alien, his felony convictions made him susceptible to deportation.

Issue

Whether the relevant section of Pub. L. No. 104-32, 440(d), was triggered by convictions that predated it, and whether Pub. L. No. 104-32, 440(d) violated Requena's equal protection rights by treating 'deportable' aliens differently from 'excludable' aliens.

The merits of Requena's appeal turn on the following two issues: (1) whether the relevant section of AEDPA, 440(d), is triggered by convictions that predated AEDPA, and (2) whether AEDPA 440(d) violates Requena's equal protection rights because it treats 'deportable' aliens differently from 'excludable' ones.

Rule

AEDPA 440(d)'s bar on discretionary relief applies to convictions that predated AEDPA, and its distinction between excludable and deportable aliens passes constitutional muster.

Analysis

The court determined that jurisdiction to entertain Requena's claims existed under 28 U.S.C. 2241, but ultimately rejected his claims on the merits. It found that the statutory limits on discretionary relief could indeed be triggered by convictions that predated the statute. Furthermore, the court held that the distinction made by AEDPA 440(d) between deportable and excludable aliens was constitutionally valid, as Requena could not demonstrate that he would have altered his behavior had he been aware of the potential for deportation.

Although this court determines that 2241 habeas jurisdiction exists to review claims such as Requena's under IIRIRA's transitional rules, it rejects Requena's claims on the merits.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the statutory limits on discretionary relief were applicable to Requena's prior convictions and that his equal protection rights were not violated.

Judgment affirmed. Statutory limits on discretionary relief could be triggered by convictions predating statute and the statutory distinction between deportation and exclusion proceedings did not violate defendant's right to equal protection.

Who won?

The Immigration and Naturalization Service prevailed in the case as the court upheld the denial of Requena's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the statutory ineligibility for discretionary relief based on his felony convictions.

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