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Keywords

jurisdictionappealmotionregulationdeportation
jurisdictionattorneypleamotionregulationdomestic violencefelonymisdemeanorprosecutordefense attorney

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Reyes-Vargas v. Barr

Facts

Juvenal Reyes-Vargas arrived in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2014, he was convicted of aggravated battery and false imprisonment after an incident involving his wife, which led to his removal from the U.S. in 2015. After his deportation, Reyes-Vargas's conviction was vacated by an Idaho state court in 2016, prompting him to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The IJ denied this motion, citing the post-departure bar, which led to the appeal to the BIA.

In 1992, Reyes-Vargas, then a thirteen-year-old boy, arrived in the United States with his family as a lawful permanent resident. By July 2014, Reyes-Vargas had married. That month, his wife reported to police that Reyes-Vargas had beaten her in their Idaho home, forced her into the basement, and restrained her there with a belt fastened around her neck. Her brother-in-law later freed her after happening by the house with her child. Consistent with her report, police saw bruises, abrasions, and red marks on her body. The police arrested Reyes-Vargas, and prosecutors soon charged him with two Idaho felonies, aggravated battery and attempted strangulation, and one misdemeanor, false imprisonment. In December 2014, Reyes-Vargas pleaded guilty to two of the charges, aggravated battery and false imprisonment, after consulting with his attorney, and two months later, the court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. But Reyes-Vargas's criminal-defense attorney had failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to this felony conviction, namely, its rendering him removable from the United States on two statutory grounds. See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), (a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence) (2012).

Issue

Did the post-departure bar under 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) eliminate the IJ's jurisdiction to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte after the alien had departed the country?

Did the post-departure bar under 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) eliminate the IJ's jurisdiction to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte after the alien had departed the country?

Rule

The court applied the principle that a regulation must be genuinely ambiguous for a court to defer to an agency's interpretation. If the regulation's plain language is clear, the court does not defer to the agency's interpretation.

We review the Board's interpretation of its regulation using the framework announced in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 204 L. Ed. 2d 841 (2019), which clarifies when and how courts defer to an agency interpreting its own regulations. Under that case, we can defer to the Board's interpretation only if we conclude, after rigorously applying all our interpretative tools, that the regulation presents a genuine ambiguity and that the agency's reading is reasonable and entitled to controlling weight.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) and concluded that it clearly indicated that the post-departure bar applies to a party's motion to reopen, not to the IJ's authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte. Therefore, the court found that the BIA's interpretation was not entitled to deference as the regulation was not genuinely ambiguous.

Applying this framework here, we conclude that the regulation is not genuinely ambiguous on the issue in disputethat is, whether the post-departure bar eliminates the IJ's jurisdiction to move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings. In fact, the regulation's plain language conclusively answers the question. The post-departure bar applies to a party's 'motion to reopen,' not to the IJ's own sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings. So we do not defer.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit granted Reyes-Vargas's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that the IJ has the jurisdiction to consider reopening the removal proceedings.

Accordingly, we grant Reyes-Vargas's petition for review, vacate the Board's decision, and remand for further proceedings.

Who won?

Juvenal Reyes-Vargas prevailed in the case because the court determined that the BIA's interpretation of the regulation was incorrect and that the IJ retained the authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.

Juvenal Reyes-Vargas prevailed in the case because the court determined that the BIA's interpretation of the regulation was incorrect and that the IJ retained the authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.

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