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Keywords

jurisdictionattorneypleafelonydeportationguilty plea

jurisdictionattorneypleadeportationguilty plea

Related Cases

Rhodes-Bradford v. Keisler

Facts

Rhodes was admitted to the United States as an immigrant on November 22, 1983. He is a lawful permanent resident and has three children who are United States citizens. On July 7, 1998, he was convicted in Connecticut Superior Court, following guilty pleas, (a) of larceny in the first degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-122, and (b) of first-degree failure to appear, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-172. The government initiated removal proceedings against Rhodes on November 28, 2003. Rhodes moved to terminate removal proceedings on the ground that, under the categorical approach utilized by this Circuit, he had not committed an aggravated felony which would render him removable.

On July 7, 1998, he was convicted in Connecticut Superior Court, following guilty pleas, (a) of larceny in the first degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-122, and (b) of first-degree failure to appear, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-172. The government initiated removal proceedings against Rhodes on November 28, 2003.

Issue

First, he asserts that the BIA has no authority to order his removal in the first instance, absent an IJ decision to that effect. Second, he argues that his first-degree larceny conviction does not constitute a 'theft offense' rendering him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA').

Petitioner raises two issues before this Court. First, he asserts that the BIA has no authority to order his removal in the first instance, absent an IJ decision to that effect. Second, he argues that his first-degree larceny conviction does not constitute a 'theft offense' rendering him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA').

Rule

The term 'order of deportation' means the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.

'The term 'order of deportation' means the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(A).

Analysis

The court held that the BIA does not have the authority to issue removal orders in the first instance. It reasoned that the absence of a valid final order meant that the court did not have jurisdiction to reach the resident's challenge to the BIA's determination that his larceny conviction constituted an aggravated felony under the INA.

We therefore hold that the BIA does not have the authority to issue removal orders in the first instance.

Conclusion

The court granted in part and dismissed in part the resident's petition for review, vacated the BIA's removal order, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings.

We therefore GRANT in part and DISMISS in part Rhodes's petition for review, VACATE the BIA's removal order, and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Who won?

The petitioner, Miguel Rhodes-Bradford, prevailed because the court agreed that the BIA did not have the authority to order his removal in the first instance.

The court agreed with Petitioner on the first issue, and therefore remand, we do not have jurisdiction to reach the second.

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