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Keywords

tortdamagessummary judgmentwillcorporationappellee
tortdamagessummary judgmentwillcorporationappellee

Related Cases

Robelo, Matter of

Facts

John Pistone was president of ARCA Corporation, a franchise and agent of UCC. His wife, Elizabeth Pistone, occasionally helped out in the corporation office on an as-needed basis, when she was available and willing to work. She was not paid for her services. On the day of the accident, John called Elizabeth and asked her to come to the office. Elizabeth was driving the van to ARCA's offices when she was involved in a collision with Javier Robelo, who died in the crash. Robelo's parents sued UCC, ARCA, and Elizabeth Pistone for damages in connection with their son's death.

John Pistone was president of ARCA Corporation, a franchise and agent of UCC. His wife, Elizabeth Pistone, occasionally helped out in the corporation office on an as needed basis, when she was available and willing to work. She was not paid for her services. On the day of the accident, John called Elizabeth and asked her to come to the office. Elizabeth was driving the van to ARCA's offices when she was involved in a collision with Javier Robelo, who died in the crash. Robelo's parents sued UCC, ARCA, and Elizabeth Pistone for damages in connection with their son's death.

Issue

Whether Elizabeth Pistone was acting in the scope of her employment with ARCA, UCC's agent, at the time of the incident.

Whether Elizabeth Pistone was acting in the scope of her employment with ARCA, UCC's agent, at the time of the incident.

Rule

A principal becomes liable for the tortious actions of its agent only if the agent acts within the scope of the agency. An employer is not liable for torts of its employees committed while the employee is either going to work or returning home, unless the employee is on a special errand for the employer.

A principal becomes liable for the tortious actions of its agent only if the agent acts within the scope of the agency. An employer is not liable for torts of its employees committed while the employee is either going to work or returning home, unless the employee is on a special errand for the employer.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether Elizabeth Pistone was on a special errand for her employer at the time of the accident. It found that she was merely traveling to the office and not engaged in any work-related task. The court noted that irregular hours alone do not constitute a special errand, and since Elizabeth was not required to be available on demand, she was not acting within the scope of her employment.

The court analyzed whether Elizabeth Pistone was on a special errand for her employer at the time of the accident. It found that she was merely traveling to the office and not engaged in any work-related task. The court noted that irregular hours alone do not constitute a special errand, and since Elizabeth was not required to be available on demand, she was not acting within the scope of her employment.

Conclusion

The entry of final summary judgment in favor of appellees was affirmed on the basis that, at the time of the accident, appellees' employee was not on a special errand for her employer, but was merely traveling to the office.

The entry of final summary judgment in favor of appellees was affirmed on the basis that, at the time of the accident, appellees' employee was not on a special errand for her employer, but was merely traveling to the office.

Who won?

United Consumers Club, Inc. and United Consumers Franchise Corporation prevailed because the court found that Elizabeth Pistone was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident.

United Consumers Club, Inc. and United Consumers Franchise Corporation prevailed because the court found that Elizabeth Pistone was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident.

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