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Robles v. People, 811 P.2d 804

Facts

From 1985 to 1988, the defendants were convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of first-degree assault, robbery of the elderly, first-degree burglary, theft, aggravated motor-vehicle theft, and seven counts of crime of violence. They were sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 112 years. The trial court's ruling was upheld by the court of appeals, which interpreted the crime-of-violence statute as mandating consecutive sentences for all convictions arising from the same incident.

Each of the defendants was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of first-degree assault, robbery of the elderly, first-degree burglary, theft, aggravated motor-vehicle theft, and seven counts of crime of violence; each was subsequently sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 112 years.

Issue

Whether the 1985 sentencing statute required the trial court to impose consecutive sentences for all crime-of-violence convictions arising out of the same incident.

The issue in this case is whether the court of appeals correctly held that the 1985 statute required the trial court to impose consecutive sentences for the five crime-of-violence convictions underlying the substantive criminal counts.

Rule

The 1985 statute mandated that a person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently.

From 1985 to 1988, subsection 16–11–309(1)(a) (the 1985 statute), under which the defendants were sentenced, provided in relevant part that “[a] person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently” (“the consecutive-sentence clause”).

Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed the language of the 1985 statute and concluded that it was not ambiguous. The court determined that while at least two consecutive sentences were required for the first two crimes of violence, the statute did not mandate consecutive sentences for any additional convictions. The court emphasized that the legislative intent was clear and did not support the court of appeals' broader interpretation.

The 1985 statute's provision that “[a] person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently” is not ambiguous.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for resentencing, clarifying that the trial court was not required to impose consecutive sentences for all crime-of-violence convictions beyond the first two.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded to the court of appeals with directions to remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Who won?

The defendants, Benito and Victor Robles, prevailed because the Supreme Court found that the sentencing statute did not require consecutive sentences for all their convictions, leading to a reversal of their lengthy sentences.

The Supreme Court, Rovira, C.J., held that sentencing statute requiring that person convicted of “two separate crimes of violence” arising out of same incident receive consecutive sentences did not require that persons convicted of more than two crimes of violence receive additional consecutive sentence for each additional conviction.

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