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statutedue process

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Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179

Facts

Four Maryland citizens and taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that provided public aid in the form of noncategorical grants to eligible colleges and universities. The statute was designed to support private higher education while prohibiting the use of funds for sectarian purposes. The District Court upheld the statute, finding that the colleges involved were not 'pervasively sectarian' and that the aid did not primarily advance religion. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

In 1971, a Maryland statute was enacted that authorizes the payment of state funds to any private institution of higher learning within the State that meets certain minimum criteria, and refrains from awarding 'only seminarian or theological degrees.' The aid is in the form of an annual fiscal year subsidy to qualifying colleges and universities, based upon the number of students, excluding those in seminarian or theological academic programs. (Per Mr. Justice Blackmun, with the Chief Justice and one Justice joining and two concurring in the judgment.)

Issue

Does the Maryland statute providing public aid to colleges and universities violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Does the Maryland statute providing public aid to colleges and universities violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Rule

The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from enacting laws that advance or inhibit religion. The Supreme Court applies a three-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which requires that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.

The command of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion' is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Per Mr. Justice Blackmun, with the Chief Justice and one Justice joining and two concurring in the judgment.) U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.

Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the Maryland statute met the requirements of the Lemon test. The aid provided was determined to have a secular purpose, as it supported private higher education. The Court agreed with the District Court's finding that the colleges were not 'pervasively sectarian,' meaning that the secular and religious functions could be separated. Additionally, the Court concluded that the statute did not foster excessive entanglement, as the colleges performed primarily secular educational functions and the administrative oversight was not overly intrusive.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling, holding that the Maryland statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.

Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 2344-2354; 2355-2356.

Who won?

The prevailing party in this case was the State of Maryland, as the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute providing public aid to colleges and universities. The Court reasoned that the aid did not primarily advance religion and that the institutions receiving the aid were not so permeated by religion that their secular functions could not be separated. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining a secular purpose in the aid program and found that the administrative measures in place effectively prevented sectarian use of the funds.

The Supreme Court is not blind to the fact that, in aiding a religious institution to perform a secular task, the state frees the institution's resources to be put to sectarian ends, but if this were impermissible, a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. (Per Mr. Justice Blackmun, with the Chief Justice and one Justice joining and two concurring in the judgment.)

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