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Keywords

statutetrial

contractplaintiffdefendantjurisdictionstatuteappealtrialmotionsustainedappellee

Related Cases

Rose v. Board of Directors of School Dist. No. 94 of Miami County, Kan., 162 Kan. 720, 179 P.2d 181

Facts

In 1882, David F. Day conveyed a one-acre tract of land to School District No. 94 with a provision that the land would revert to the grantors if abandoned for school purposes. The district built several structures on the site and maintained a school until around 1933, when it was alleged that the school was abandoned. John Rose, through subsequent conveyances, claimed ownership of the land and the buildings, asserting that upon abandonment, the title reverted to him. The school district moved to strike Rose's claims regarding the buildings, leading to the trial court's ruling in favor of the district.

the petition, in substance, alleges the facts heretofore stated and in addition, avers that the defendant is about to sell and dispose of a school house, a coal house and two out buildings it had erected on the site.

Issue

Whether John Rose acquired title to the buildings located on the one-acre tract upon the alleged abandonment of the land for school purposes.

the sole question involved in this appeal is whether, assuming abandonment by the district of the one acre tract for school purposes as alleged in the petition, the plaintiff when such abandonment occurred, acquired title to and ownership of the buildings located on the abandoned site under and by virtue of the terms and conditions of the deed from Day to the district.

Rule

The powers of a school district board are limited to what is expressly conferred or necessarily implied by statute, and any reversion clause in a deed must be strictly construed.

The power of a school district to contract is only such as is conferred, either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute is well established law in this and other jurisdictions.

Analysis

The court analyzed the deed's reversion clause and the statutory limitations on the school district's authority to dispose of property. It concluded that the district's acceptance of the deed did not grant it the power to bind itself to conditions that were ultra vires, meaning beyond its legal authority. The court emphasized that the reversion clause could not be interpreted to include buildings placed on the land after the deed was executed, as the statute required proper authorization for the sale or disposal of school property.

the action of the trial court, in sustaining the motion to strike and in then rendering judgment dissolving the restraining order and decreeing the appellees to be the owners of such property with full and complete right to sell, remove and dispose of the same, was proper.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that the school district retained ownership of the buildings and had the right to sell or remove them, as the reversion clause did not apply to the structures.

the judgment of the court below must be sustained.

Who won?

The Board of Directors of School District No. 94 prevailed in the case because the court found that the reversion clause in the deed did not transfer ownership of the buildings to John Rose upon abandonment.

the court found that the reversion clause in the deed did not transfer ownership of the buildings to John Rose upon abandonment.

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