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Keywords

defendantmotionsummary judgmentmotion for summary judgment
motionsummary judgmentappellantmotion for summary judgment

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Rosenthal v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 273 N.Y. 522, 6 N.E.2d 609

Facts

The action was brought on a policy of life insurance containing disability benefits issued by the defendant to the intestate. The intestate claimed he was entitled to total disability payments and the return of premiums paid during his total disability. His disability began on March 18, 1934, and he turned sixty on July 10, 1934. The insurance policy included provisions for disability benefits before and after age sixty, which became the crux of the dispute.

The date of the commencement of intestate's disability was March 18, 1934, his sixtieth birthday was on July 10, 1934, and the anniversary of the policy nearest to his sixtieth birthday was February 1, 1934.

Issue

Did the insured become totally disabled within the meaning of the policy before or after the anniversary upon which his age at nearest birthday was sixty years?

The appellant contended that the insured did not become totally disabled within the meaning of the policy until after the anniversary upon which his age at nearest birthday was sixty years.

Rule

The provisions of the insurance policy regarding disability payments before age sixty and those after age sixty were deemed ambiguous, and the language of the policy should be construed in favor of the insured.

The Appellate Division, in affirming the order granting intestate's motion for summary judgment, held that the provisions of the policy with respect to the disability payments before age sixty, and those with respect to the benefits after age sixty, were ambiguous and that the language of the policy being that of the insurance company should be construed in favor of the insured.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the insurance policy and determined that the provisions regarding disability benefits were ambiguous. It concluded that the insured's claim for total disability payments was valid because the policy's terms were not clear enough to deny benefits based on the timing of the disability relative to the insured's age.

The court analyzed the language of the insurance policy and determined that the provisions regarding disability benefits were ambiguous.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the order granting the intestate's motion for summary judgment, ruling in favor of the insured due to the ambiguity in the policy's language.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Who won?

The intestate prevailed in the case because the court found the insurance policy's language ambiguous and ruled in favor of the insured's interpretation.

The Appellate Division, in affirming the order granting intestate's motion for summary judgment, held that the provisions of the policy with respect to the disability payments before age sixty, and those with respect to the benefits after age sixty, were ambiguous and that the language of the policy being that of the insurance company should be construed in favor of the insured.

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