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Keywords

negligenceliabilityappealtrialsummary judgmentleasecorporation
attorneytrialsummary judgmentleasecorporation

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Russ v. General Motors Corp., 111 Nev. 1431, 906 P.2d 718

Facts

Laura Russ and her daughter were involved in an automobile accident with Scott Haigh while driving a 1990 Chevrolet Astro Van manufactured by General Motors and sold by Fairway Chevrolet. Following the accident, Laura settled with Haigh's insurer, signing a release that discharged Haigh and all other persons, firms, and corporations from claims arising from the accident. Subsequently, the Russes filed a complaint against General Motors and Fairway, alleging defects and negligence related to the van, but General Motors moved for summary judgment based on the release Laura had signed.

Laura Russ (“Laura”) and her daughter were involved in an automobile accident with Scott Haigh (“Haigh”) on October 3, 1991. Laura was driving a 1990 Chevrolet Astro Van, manufactured by General Motors Corporation (“General Motors”), a Delaware corporation, and sold to Laura by Fairway Chevrolet (“Fairway”), a Nevada corporation.

Issue

Did Laura Russ's signed release discharge General Motors and Fairway from liability for her injuries resulting from the accident?

The key question in this case is whether the “any and all persons, firms or corporations” language in the release signed by Laura discharged General Motors and Fairway.

Rule

The intentions of the parties signing a general release are relevant and merit consideration when interpreting the scope of the release, and parol evidence may be considered to determine the intent behind the release.

We conclude that the intentions of a party signing a general release are relevant and merit consideration when interpreting the scope of a release.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the release and the intent of Laura Russ when she signed it. Despite the clear wording of the release, the court found that the declaration from Laura's counsel's legal assistant raised a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Laura intended to release General Motors and Fairway. The court emphasized that the intentions of the parties should be considered, and the evidence presented was sufficient to question the applicability of the release to the manufacturer and dealership.

The Potter declaration, and the inferences drawn from it, sufficiently raised a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Laura actually released General Motors or Fairway.

Conclusion

The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of General Motors and Fairway, concluding that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding Laura's intent in signing the release.

Accordingly, we hereby reverse the district court's summary judgment and attorney's fees orders, and remand this case for trial.

Who won?

The Russes prevailed in the appeal because the court found that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding Laura's intent in signing the release, which warranted further examination in trial.

The Russes' complaint was based upon reasonable grounds.

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