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Keywords

legislative intent
lease

Related Cases

Ryan v. Chapman, 273 A.D. 99, 76 N.Y.S.2d 341

Facts

Fortune Peter Ryan and Anne Worrall Ryan, a married couple domiciled in New York, sought a refund of their 1943 and 1944 income taxes after the State Tax Commission determined they were taxable residents of New York. The husband was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and stationed in California from April 1942 until August 1945, during which time his family joined him and they maintained a residence in California. They had no residence in New York during this period and did not spend any time there.

In April, 1942 the husband was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army any was assigned to duty at the Merced Army Air Field at Merced, California, where he arrived April 21, 1942. He became Post Adjutant of the Headquarters and was stationed there continuously until August, 1945. His wife and children joined him and beginning July 1, 1942 they resided in a leased home at Merced, California. They gave up the apartment they had occupied previously in New York and had no residence in the State from 1942 until his discharge from the Army in August 1945, and spent no time here.

Issue

Whether the petitioners were taxable residents of New York for the years 1943 and 1944, given their military service and residence in California.

Whether the petitioners were taxable residents of New York for the years 1943 and 1944, given their military service and residence in California.

Rule

The term 'resident' applies only to natural persons and includes any person domiciled in the state, except a person who, though domiciled in the state, maintains no permanent place of abode within the state, but does maintain a permanent place of abode without the state, and who spends in the aggregate not to exceed thirty days of the taxable year within the state.

The word 'resident’ applies only to natural persons and includes any person domiciled in the state, except a person who, though domiciled in the state, maintains no permanent place of abode within the state, but does maintain a permanent place of abode without the state, and who spends in the aggregate not to exceed thirty days of the taxable year within the state.

Analysis

The court analyzed the facts against the statutory definition of 'resident' and determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for being considered taxable residents of New York. They had no permanent place of abode in New York and maintained a permanent place of abode in California during the years in question, spending less than thirty days in New York. The court also noted that the legislative intent was to exclude members of the armed forces who were not domiciled in New York from being taxed as residents.

The court analyzed the facts against the statutory definition of 'resident' and determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for being considered taxable residents of New York.

Conclusion

The court annulled the determination of the State Tax Commission, concluding that the petitioners were not taxable residents of New York for the years 1943 and 1944.

The determination of the State Tax Commission should be annulled on the law and facts with $50 costs and disbursements.

Who won?

The petitioners, Fortune Peter Ryan and Anne Worrall Ryan, prevailed in the case because the court found that they did not meet the criteria for being taxable residents of New York, as they maintained a permanent residence in California and spent minimal time in New York.

Petitioner concedes that his domicile remained in the State of New York, and that he expected to return there upon his release from the army.

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