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Keywords

attorneystatuteequityappealverdictfiduciarytrustunjust enrichmentconstructive trust
plaintiffstatuteverdictpleacivil procedureappellantappellee

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Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 413 A.2d 1059

Facts

The dispute arose from a complaint in equity filed by Davida Sack against her sister Isabel Feinman, alleging that Feinman fraudulently converted their mother's assets through powers of attorney. The chancellor found that Feinman redeemed savings bonds and certificates belonging to their mother without her instruction, resulting in a constructive trust of $25,000 in favor of Sack. Following this, Sack sought pre-verdict interest, which the chancellor denied, leading to the appeal.

The facts underlying this action are clear cut. At the time of the adjudication by the court of common pleas in 1975, appellant was 49 years old, appellee was 59, and a third sister, Ruth Gland, was 54 years old.

Issue

Did Davida Sack waive her right to claim pre-verdict interest, and was the chancellor's denial of such interest justified?

Appellee contends that the issue of interest has been waived by appellant's failure to file exceptions to the chancellor's supplemental adjudication and decree nisi, as required by Pa.Civil Procedure Rule 1518.

Rule

A party seeking pre-verdict interest does not waive the issue by failing to file exceptions to a chancellor's supplemental adjudication, and a prayer for general relief in a complaint can provide a foundation for claiming pre-verdict interest.

The prayer for general relief states in full: Wherefore, plaintiff respectfully prays: (e) Such other relief as to your Honorable Court shall seem necessary and proper.

Analysis

The court determined that Sack's petition to amend the decree was intended as an exception to the chancellor's ruling, thus complying with procedural requirements. The court also found that the chancellor's interpretation of the statute regarding interest was overly restrictive and that pre-verdict interest could be awarded in cases of unjust enrichment, particularly where a fiduciary relationship existed.

The chancellor interpreted this statute as follows: The wording of this statute is clear. Interest does not run from the date of the wrong, but runs instead from the date of the verdict.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the chancellor to make specific findings regarding the denial of pre-verdict interest, emphasizing the need for clarity in the chancellor's reasoning.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the chancellor for the purpose of enabling him to make specific findings pursuant to Rule 1517 regarding his decision not to exercise his discretion to allow pre-verdict interest in this case.

Who won?

Davida Sack prevailed in the appeal as the court ruled that her claim for pre-verdict interest was valid and warranted further examination.

The Supreme Court held that: (1) party seeking preverdict interest on award did not waive issue of interest by reason of her failure to file exceptions to chancellor's supplemental adjudication and decree nisi.

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