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contractlawsuitattorneytrialverdictappellantappellee
contractlawsuitdamagesattorneytrialappellantappellee

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Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383

Facts

In June 2000, Appellant Joy Salmon hired Appellees Virginia Atkinson and James Howell to pursue a claim against the estate of George Brown on a contingent-fee basis. After conducting research and preparing a petition for Salmon, the attorneys were discharged by her via a letter dated August 1, 2000. Subsequently, the attorneys filed a quantum meruit action seeking compensation for their services, which led to a jury verdict in their favor.

In June 2000, Appellant hired Appellees to pursue a claim for damages against the estate of George Brown. Appellees then began to work on Appellant's case. … The next communication Appellees received from Appellant was a letter, dated August 1, informing them that their services were no longer required.

Issue

Whether an attorney who enters into a contingent-fee contract with a client and is later discharged by the client may bring an action for a quantum meruit fee prior to the resolution of the former client's lawsuit.

Whether an attorney who enters into a contingent-fee contract with a client and is later discharged by the client may bring an action for a quantum meruit fee prior to the resolution of the former client's lawsuit.

Rule

A discharged attorney may be paid for the reasonable value of his or her services notwithstanding that the parties originally entered into a contingent-fee contract.

A discharged attorney may be paid for the reasonable value of his or her services notwithstanding that the parties originally entered into a contingent-fee contract.

Analysis

The court applied the 'New York rule,' which states that a discharged attorney's cause of action for quantum meruit accrues immediately upon discharge and is not dependent on the former client's recovery. The court found that the attorneys had conferred a benefit upon the client by providing legal services, and thus, they were entitled to compensation for their work despite the contingent-fee arrangement.

Applying that rule to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding a quantum meruit fee to Appellees.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, allowing the attorneys to recover a quantum meruit fee for their services rendered prior to their discharge.

We thus affirm the trial court's judgment.

Who won?

Appellees Virginia Atkinson and James Howell prevailed in the case because the court determined that they were entitled to recover fees for their services under the quantum meruit theory, despite the contingent-fee contract.

Appellees' cause of action to recover reasonable attorney's fees, under the theory of quantum meruit, accrued immediately upon their being discharged by Appellant.

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