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Sanchez-Rojas; U.S. v.

Facts

Manuel Sanchez-Rojas pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry as a removed alien after an aggravated felony conviction. The district court determined his base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and increased it due to his prior burglary convictions under California law. After adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was set, leading to a sentence of 37 months' imprisonment.

The district court determined that Sanchez-Rojas's base offense level was eight under 2L1.2(a) of the 2015 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.). After increasing the offense level by eight for previously having been deported after 'a conviction for an aggravated felony,' U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), and reducing the offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, the court determined that Sanchez-Rojas's total offense level was 13, his criminal history category was V, and his advisory Guidelines sentencing range was 30 to 37 months' imprisonment.

Issue

Whether the district court erred in enhancing Sanchez-Rojas's sentence based on his prior burglary convictions and whether the residual clause of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutionally vague.

Sanchez-Rojas argues that the district court plainly erred in increasing his base offense level by eight under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).

Rule

The court applied the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, specifically 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), which allows for sentence enhancements based on prior convictions classified as aggravated felonies.

For purposes of the enhancement, 'aggravated felony' has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)).

Analysis

The court reasoned that the enhancement was proper as Sanchez-Rojas's prior burglary convictions fell within the definition of 'aggravated felony' under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court also noted that the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges, distinguishing them from the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause, which had been struck down.

Applying the Beckles / Johnson reasoning here, Sanchez-Rojas cannot maintain his vagueness challenge against U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). We see no meaningful difference between a Guidelines section that uses the same language as a statute (like 4B1.2(a)(2)) and a section that incorporates the statutory language by reference (like 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).

Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable and that the enhancement was valid.

The sentence is affirmed.

Who won?

The United States prevailed in the case as the court upheld the sentence and the enhancement based on Sanchez-Rojas's prior convictions.

The court expressed 'some concern that the advisory guideline range [was] not sufficient,' but ultimately decided to impose a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range.

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