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Keywords

zoningregulationappellant

zoningappellantappellee

Related Cases

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671, 7 Media L. Rep. 1426

Facts

In 1973, the appellants began operating an adult bookstore in Mount Ephraim, New Jersey, which sold adult books and films. In 1976, they added a coin-operated mechanism for customers to watch live nude dancers. Following complaints, they were charged with violating a zoning ordinance that restricted uses in commercial zones. The Municipal Court found them guilty, and their conviction was upheld by the Camden County Court and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

In 1973, appellants began operating an adult bookstore in the commercial zone in the Borough of Mount Ephraim in Camden County, N. J. The store sold adult books, magazines, and films.

Issue

Did the zoning ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Rule

The First Amendment requires sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of protected expression from permitted commercial uses, and any zoning regulation that impinges on free speech must be narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest.

The First Amendment requires sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of protected expression from the permitted commercial uses, and none of appellee's asserted justifications withstands scrutiny.

Analysis

The Court found that the borough's ordinance, which excluded all live entertainment, was overly broad and lacked sufficient justification. The borough's claims that live entertainment would conflict with its commercial zoning plan and that it posed unique problems were not supported by evidence. The Court emphasized that the ordinance did not demonstrate that live entertainment was incompatible with other permitted uses.

The ordinance in question, as construed by the New Jersey courts to exclude live entertainment, including nude dancing, throughout the borough, prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Conclusion

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the appellants, ruling that the borough failed to justify the exclusion of live entertainment from its commercial zones.

Accordingly, the convictions of these appellants are infirm, and the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Who won?

The appellants prevailed because the Court determined that their First Amendment rights were violated by the borough's unjustified exclusion of live entertainment.

The Court found that the borough's ordinance, which excluded all live entertainment, was overly broad and lacked sufficient justification.

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