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Keywords

lawsuitdamagesstatutemotionsummary judgmentmalpracticestatute of limitationsmotion for summary judgment
lawsuitdamagesstatutemotionsummary judgmentmalpracticemotion for summary judgment

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Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187

Facts

James Dennis Schlote was diagnosed with throat cancer by Dr. Douglas E. Dawson, who recommended and performed surgery to remove Schlote's voice box. Schlote was not informed of alternative treatments and agreed to the surgery, which resulted in the loss of his voice. After discovering potential issues with the surgery in 1998, Schlote filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dawson in 2000, claiming the surgery was unnecessary and excessive. Dr. Dawson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by Iowa's medical malpractice statute of limitations.

A family doctor referred James Dennis Schlote to Dr. Douglas E. Dawson for a sore throat. Schlote's first contact with Dr. Dawson was May 2, 1996. On that date Dr. Dawson told Schlote he had cancer of the throat, and the cancer was lying on top of his voice box. Dr. Dawson also told Schlote that he needed an operation to remove his voice box and without the operation he would die. Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that radiation treatment rather than surgery might be an option. Nor did he tell Schlote about a more conservative surgery that might avoid a complete removal of his voice box. Schlote agreed to the surgery to remove his voice box.

Issue

Whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the patient's awareness of the injury and the applicability of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.

Dr. Dawson raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Schlote was aware of the injury more than two years before the Schlotes filed suit, and (2) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied in this case.

Rule

Under Iowa Code section 614.1(9), medical malpractice claims must be brought within two years after the claimant knew, or through reasonable diligence should have known, of the injury for which damages are sought. The term 'injury' refers to physical harm rather than the wrongful act that caused the injury.

Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared: 9. Malpractice. … [T]hose founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against any physician …, arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first…. Iowa Code § 614.1(9) (emphasis added).

Analysis

The court analyzed the meaning of 'injury' in the context of the statute of limitations and concluded that it refers to the physical harm resulting from the surgery, specifically the removal of Schlote's voice box. The court determined that Schlote was aware of this injury at the time of the surgery in May 1996, and thus the statute of limitations began to run at that time. The court rejected the Schlotes' argument that the injury was the excessive nature of the surgery, stating that the statute does not require knowledge of the wrongful act to trigger the limitations period.

The critical language in section 614.1(9) is 'injury or death for which damages are sought.' Dr. Dawson contends as he did in the district court that the 'injury' for purposes of section 614.1(9) was the removal of Schlote's voice box. Because the Schlotes filed their lawsuit more than two years after the surgery to remove Schlote's voice box, section 614.1(9) bars the suit under this interpretation of the statute.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant Dr. Dawson's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the malpractice action was time-barred.

We therefore reverse and remand for an order sustaining Dr. Dawson's motion for summary judgment.

Who won?

Dr. Douglas E. Dawson prevailed in the case because the court found that the statute of limitations barred the Schlotes' claims, as they were aware of the injury more than two years before filing the lawsuit.

Dr. Dawson contended that the 'injury' for purposes of section 614.1(9) was Schlote's loss of his natural voice. This injury, Dr. Dawson argued, was known to Schlote more than two years before he filed suit and for that reason the suit was time-barred.

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